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TRANSPARENCY AND ACCOUNTABILITY FOR THE GLOBAL GOODい THE UKげS 
IMPLEMENTATION OF EU LAW REQUIRING COUNTRY-BY-COUNTRY 
REPORTING OF PAYMENTS TO GOVERNMENTS BY EXTRACTIVES  
ABSTRACT 
We draw upon the critical accounting literature to theorise what we see here as an accounting 
mobilisation and functioning in context. The manifestation entails ostensibly a progressive 
transparency and accountability and merits critical attention vis-à-vis concerns to better link 
accounting with the common good.  We here find Gallhofer et al. (2015) and Gallhofer & 
Haslam (2017ぶが ┘ｷデｴ デｴWｷヴ ;ヮヮヴWIｷ;デｷﾗﾐ ﾗa けWﾏ;ﾐIｷヮ;デﾗヴ┞げ SｷﾏWﾐゲｷﾗﾐゲ ﾗa ;IIﾗ┌ﾐデｷﾐｪ ;ﾐS ｴﾗ┘ 
;IIﾗ┌ﾐデｷﾐｪ I;ﾐ HWIﾗﾏW けﾏﾗヴW (or less) Wﾏ;ﾐIｷヮ;デﾗヴ┞げが ; useful framing, especially if, informed 
by critical studies that have problematised dimensions of transparency and accountability 
systems, their notions of the complex and multifaceted ambivalence of accounting systems 
are elaborated more explicitly vis-à-vis transparency and accountability. We focus upon the 
UKげゲ ｷﾏヮﾉWﾏWﾐデ;デｷﾗﾐ of Ch;ヮデWヴ ヱヰ ﾗa デｴW EUげゲ AIIﾗ┌ﾐデｷﾐｪ DｷヴWIデｷ┗W ふand the equivalent 
Transparency Directive provisions), which is ostensibly progressive legislation prescribing 
Reports on Payments to Governments. Our empirical study indicates both progressive and 
problematic dimensions of the accounting and its dynamics in context, extending theoretical 
appreciation including for praxis.  
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INTRODUCTION 
We here draw upon the critical accounting literature to theorise and gain insights from an 
instance ﾗa け;IIﾗ┌ﾐデｷﾐｪげ1 mobilisation and functioning in context. We focus upon デｴW UKげゲ 
implementation ﾗa Cｴ;ヮデWヴ ヱヰ ﾗa デｴW EUげゲ AIIﾗ┌ﾐデｷﾐｪ DｷヴWIデｷ┗W ふand its equivalent 
Transparency Directive provisions). This law requires in-scope extractive companies domiciled 
in member states (and, by the Transparency Directive, outside companies listed on EU stock 
exchanges) to each publish a Report on Payments to Governments (RPG).  Ostensibly, it 
constitutes a victory for civil society organizations long campaigning for increased 
transparency and accountability through country-by-country reporting (CBCR). Such 
reporting can on the face of it pressurize governments, and corporations, to be more 
accountable, fostering challenges to corruption and/or to low corporate payments to 
governments, with benefits in terms of addressing poverty. Especially vis-à-vis countries 
hosting extractives, addressing poverty is often articulated in terms of overcoming the 
resource curse.2 We focus upon the UK (an EU member at the time of writing and the EU 
country with the largest interests in the W┝デヴ;Iデｷ┗Wゲげ ゲWIデﾗヴ), W┝ヮﾉﾗヴｷﾐｪ デｴW ﾉ;┘げゲ transposition 
and companiWゲげ ｷﾏヮﾉWﾏWﾐデ;デｷﾗﾐ of the law. The focus especially merits critical attention 
regarding concerns to better link accounting with a notion of the common good.   
Gallhofer et al. (2015) and Gallhofer & Haslam (2017) here provide a useful framing in terms 
of their けWﾏ;ﾐIｷヮ;デﾗヴ┞ accountingげ theorising, including their articulation ﾗa ;IIﾗ┌ﾐデｷﾐｪげゲ 
complex and multifaceted ambivalence. The latter relies upon appreciation of continuum 
theorising, which recognises the mix (progressive and regressive) of forces at work in and 
through accounting and the relative character of dynamic shifts thereof. Gallhofer & H;ゲﾉ;ﾏげゲ 
ふヲヰヱΑぶ けﾐW┘ ヮヴ;ｪﾏ;デｷゲﾏげ Wﾏヮｴ;ゲｷゲWゲ both the rationale for intervention and the complex and 
multifaceted character of its impacts. We aim to elaborate and develop this theorising with 
reference explicitly to transparency and accountability, taking insights from critical studies 
problematising aspects of transparency and accountability (e.g. Messner, 2009; Roberts, 
2009). We seek to develop the theorising through empirical analysis (which has been scarce 
                                                          
1 Usage of quotation marks reflects our delineation of accounting here, which, if consistent with Gallhofer et al. 
(2015) and much of the social accounting and related literature, may be controversial for some vis-à-vis the 
phenomenon focused upon. This merits clarification later in the paper. 
2 This curse has been articulated asぎ けぐデｴW IﾗヴヴWﾉ;デｷﾗﾐ HWデ┘WWﾐぐabundance of oil, gas and mineral resources 
and low economic growth and human development in many countries. It is a critical issue as, paradoxically, two-
デｴｷヴSゲ ﾗa デｴW ┘ﾗヴﾉSげゲ ヮﾗﾗヴWゲデ ヮWﾗヮﾉW ﾉｷ┗W ｷﾐ ヴWゲﾗ┌ヴIW-ヴｷIｴ SW┗Wﾉﾗヮｷﾐｪ Iﾗ┌ﾐデヴｷWゲげ ふOヴ;ﾐﾃW & Parham, 2009, p. 26). 
O┌ヴ ┌ゲ;ｪW ｴWヴW ﾗa ┘ﾗヴSゲっW┝ヮヴWゲゲｷﾗﾐゲ ﾉｷﾆW けﾗゲデWﾐゲｷHﾉ┞げ ;ﾐS けﾗﾐ デｴW a;IW ﾗa ｷデげ ヴWaﾉWIデゲ ;ヮヮヴWIｷ;デｷﾗﾐ ﾗa a;ｷﾉｷﾐｪゲ ﾗa 
Western-centric approaches to overcome issues of underdevelopment and poverty (on which there are many 
texts and perspectives, e.g., Bond & Dor, 2003, Young, 2016, and, nearer to our focus, Bakre & Lauwo, 2016; 
Lassou & Hopper, 2016; Hopper et al., 2017; Egbon et al., 2018, Ejiogu et al., 2018), leading us towards a reflexive 
approach in this analysis. 
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vis-à-vis this theorising). A further contribution here is in our particular empirical focus: an 
accounting prescribed in law that is ostensibly progressive (quite explicitly linked to common 
good aims to counter poverty and spread opportunities) is not easily categorised by the 
conventional/social/counter accounting scheme referenced by Gallhofer & Haslam (2003, 
2017). It is here a worthy empirical focus promising insight.3 
Focusing upon exploring processes of the UK l;┘げゲ Iﾗﾐゲデヴ┌Iデｷﾗﾐ ;ﾐS W;ヴﾉ┞ ;Sﾗヮデｷﾗﾐ in context, 
we inform our analysis through applying a variety of research methods and gathering a range 
of empirical evidence.  We contextualise the focal phenomenon by articulating aspects of its 
historical development and situating it vis-à-vis developments paralleling or overlapping with 
it. We examine documentary evidence pertaining to the accounting ﾉ;┘げゲ aﾗヴﾏ;デｷﾗﾐ and 
related industry guidance, including: draft and final EU and UK legislation; debates and 
stakeholder commentary documented during consultations over the ﾉ;┘げゲ construction (BIS, 
2014a,b) including associated industry guidance (notably the International Association of Oil 
and Gas Producers guidance, IOGP, 2016); legal counsel deliberations; Business Innovation 
and Skills (BIS)4 reports; and evidence from civil society organisations, e.g. Publish What You 
Pay (PWYP), Transparency International and Oxfam UK, who actively lobbied for CBCR. We 
explore fifty RPGs (of first-time compliers) to understand how companies have so far 
interpreted the law. And we gain further insights into key constituency views and illuminate 
the process of translating and interpreting accounting law in practice by analysing transcripts 
of four semi-structured interviews (conducted in the months of 2017 preceding Tヴ┌ﾏヮげゲ 
election as U.S. president5). The interviewees were a QC6 who counselled civil society on 
interpretation of this accounting law, a senior UK legislator, a civil society corporate 
transparency campaigner and an extractives industry representative.7  
Our analysis highlights several themes concerning how the accounting law has manifested: 
issues in デｴW ﾉ;┘げゲ Iﾗﾐゲデヴ┌Iデｷﾗﾐが ﾉ;ﾐｪ┌;ｪW ;ﾐS ﾗヮ;ケ┌WﾐWゲゲ; conflicting views expressed by the 
accountancy profession, industry representatives and civil society during the l;┘げゲ 
                                                          
3 The Extractive Industry Transparency Initiative (EITI) is in contrast voluntary, although once signed up to entails 
obligations. Research has been done on this (Ejiogu et al., 2018, is a recent example), which helps situate our 
focus. 
4 BIS and the Department of Energy and Climate Change merged in 2016, forming the Department for Business, 
Energy and Industrial Strategy (BEIS) (https://www.gov.uk/government/organisations/department-for-
business-innovation-skills). 
5 We refer to this as it unfavourably changed the context promoting disclosure (subter). 
6 Q┌WWﾐげゲ Counsel (QC) refers to an eminent lawyer formally appointed by the Queen in commonwealth 
countries (normally experienced barristers in England). 
7 We refer subsequently to the QC as QC, the legislator as LG, the campaigner as TC and the industry 
representative as IR. Our approach reflects L;┌ｪｴﾉｷﾐげゲ ふヱΓΓヵぶ けﾏｷSSﾉW-ヴ;ﾐｪWげ ヮWヴゲヮWIデｷ┗W ｷﾐ デｴ;デ (along with 
balance in philosophical assumptions brought to research and our critical stance) we have a prior theoretical 
position, reflecting an appreciation of the lawげゲ ヮヴﾗｪヴWゲゲｷ┗WﾐWゲゲ ;ﾐS ﾗ┌ヴ ┘ﾗヴヴｷWゲ デｴ;デ デｴW ﾉ;┘げゲ ヮﾗデWﾐtial may be 
undermined and will likely need to be defended and strengthened, but we are also open to being informed by 




transposition from EU Law; how industry guidelines interpreted the law; and some issues in 
early reporting manifestations. We tend to confirm Gallhofer & H;ゲﾉ;ﾏげゲ ふヲヰヱ7) thesis (see 
their note 37) in so far as ostensibly progressive types of reporting have problematic as well 
as progressive actual and potential dimensions in their manifestations and functioning. Our 
analysis highlights in this regard ambivalence in the accounting/accountability mobilised. We 
uncover both progressive and problematic dimensions of the focal accounting and its 
dynamics in context. We find progressive dimensions of this accounting in practice, reflecting, 
e.g., at least partially the ostensible intentions to raise citizen-empowering transparency to 
hold governments accountable for extractives-generated revenues. Concurrently, we 
elaborate problematic dimensions, notably how some interpretations of the law in practice 
Iﾗ┌ﾐデWヴ デｴW ﾉ;┘げゲ ゲヮｷヴｷデ vis-à-vis relatively weak regulation. Appreciation of comparable 
efforts to enhance transparency and accountability is here helpful for the analysis. We 
illuminate circumstances fostering more progressive accounting/accountability. The 
empirical study extends and refines theoretical appreciation.  Reflecting on our analysis, we 
summarise insights and suggest ways forward towards the better realisation of the 
ｷﾐデWヴ┗Wﾐデｷﾗﾐげゲ ゲデ;デWS ;ｷﾏゲが drawing from the appreciation of praxis in Gallhofer & Haslam 
(2003, 2017). Reflecting this in the current context we offer some recommendations for 
strengthening the law and the related reporting practice.8  
Our analysis is thus structured as follows. We elaborate our theoretical framing. We explore 
the empirical case focused upon. We discuss and analyse our case in relation to theory 
elaboration and development. Finally, we offer concluding comments. 
THEORETICAL FRAMING 
Accounting and related practices, such as auditing, are often rhetorically supported as 
professional practices serving the public interest (Willmott, 1990; Baker, 2005, 2014; Gallhofer 
& Haslam, 2007). The more evident intersection of accounting manifestations with the law 
helps signpost their more general regulatory, as well as (contextually) their ethical, character. 
That is, one appreciates that accounting can be more clearly seen as at least having potential 
implications for social well-being. A regulatory dimension is quite pervasive in ;IIﾗ┌ﾐデｷﾐｪげゲ 
mobilisation and functioning. Critical perspectives on accounting, as well as on accountability 
and auditing, including critical appreciations of social and environmental accounting/auditing, 
have problematised these systems (sometimes seeing them as reflecting a conservative 
problematic hegemony) including vis-à-vis their public interest claims (see Willmott, 1990). 
                                                          
8 Evidence-based policy recommendations have been published for interested stakeholders, particularly civil 
society organisations, to use in communications with government, regulators, standard-setters and general 
campaigners (Reference withheld: blind review). Civil society and industry representatives were asked by BEIS 
to contribute to a consultation reviewing the UK Law (submitted November 2017, see 
http://www.publishwhatyoupay.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/11/2017-11-PWYP-submission-to-UK-






The latter claims can constitute a symbolic discourse imposing institutional control over 
accounting, protecting institutional work and securing benefits for practitioners. The notion 
that serving presumed narrow economic interests of investors translates into the public 
interest or public good is controversial (see Baker, 2005, 2014; Gallhofer & Haslam, 2007; 
Dellaportas & Davenport, 2008): even where mobilised with an apparent aim to do good, 
much of the force of accountings in practice is found wanting, even contradicting that aim.  
Concurrently, there is a moderating and even counter discourse that also claims the status of 
a critical perspective on accounting, accountability and auditing. For some, accounting and 
related systems, actually and potentially, have enabling and emancipatory dimensions 
aligning them in some ways to serving progressive notions of the public good, けHW┞ﾗﾐS ﾐ;ヴヴﾗ┘ 
ゲｴ;ヴWｴﾗﾉSWヴ ┘W;ﾉデｴ ﾏ;┝ｷﾏｷゲ;デｷﾗﾐげ ふKｷﾉﾉｷ;ﾐ & Oげ‘Wｪ;ﾐが ヲヰヱΑぶぎ a range of academic accounting 
studies inform emancipatory projects through what Gallhofer & Haslam (2017) term a new 
pragmatist lens, e.g. Bebbington et al. (2007), Brown (2009, 2017), Bebbington et al. (2014), 
Atkins et al. (2015), Brown & Dillard (2015), Atkins et al. (2017), Crawford (2017), Gallhofer & 
Haslam (2017). 9 
In discourses of emancipatory accounting, Gallhofer & Haslam (2003, 2017) and Gallhofer et 
al. (2015) articulate a critical theoretical perspective drawing from post-structuralist, 
postmodern and post-Marxist theorizing. They suggest けWﾏ;ﾐIｷヮ;デﾗヴ┞ ;IIﾗ┌ﾐデｷﾐｪげ ｷゲ HWゲデ 
seen as accounting positively serving an array of progressive interests, identities and projects: 
moving away from location of the construct in a kind of revolutionary Marxism (see also 
Brown, 2017). In their けIﾗﾐデｷﾐ┌┌ﾏ デｴWﾗヴｷゲｷﾐｪげ, accountings (and related phenomena) are seen 
as complex and multi-faceted. Not only are accountings fusions of emancipatory and 
repressive forces, there is a dynamic in and through them whereby they can become more or 
less emancipatory/progressive over time. Following the post-structuralist and postmodern 
influences (and drawing upon Alvesson & Willmott, 1992, an acknowledged influence on 
Gallhofer & Haslam, 2003), Gallhofer & Haslam (2017) seek to uncover positive forces (which 
might especially be overlooked) in the detail of a focal research object and its functioning. 
Gallhofer et al. (2015) and Gallhofer & Haslam (2017) articulate a social analysis of accounting 
indicating how accounting can come to follow more positive or more negative trajectories in 
the above terms.10 Gallhofer & Haslam (2017) do indicate the weight (in a subjective and 
relative sense) of the negatives in their perspective, while being concerned to redress 
something of a lacuna in the critical literature whereby positives are overlooked. We can here 
                                                          
9 We in effect here use notions of public interest, public good, common good and global good interchangeably. 
TｴW ﾉ;┘げゲ ゲデ;デWS ｪﾗ;ﾉ ;ﾐS Iｷ┗ｷﾉ ゲﾗIｷWデ┞げゲ ｷﾐデWヴWゲデ ｷﾐ デｴW ﾉ;┘ IﾉW;ヴﾉ┞ ｷﾐSｷI;デW ヮヴﾗｪヴWゲゲｷ┗WﾐWゲゲ ｷﾐが Wくｪくぎ Wﾏヮﾗ┘Wヴｷﾐｪ 
local communities; countering tax abuse; assisting development (see European Commission, 2013, paragraph 7; 
PWYP, 2018) but one should critically interrogate practice. The nature of the public good is clearly contested 
and there are difficulties involved in serving it, indicating the need for critical assessment (Baker, 2005, 2014). 
Given the focus on accounting law here there are parallels between our theorising and theorising in critical legal 
studies, including the concern to work with progressive notions of the public good (see Unger, 1983; Kelman, 
1987; Moore, 1991; Tushnet, 1991). 
10 They refer to complex dynamic impacts of interactions between accounting elements (e.g. the content, form, 
usage and aura of accounting) vis-à-vis contextual dynamics. TｴW┞ ;ﾉゲﾗ ｷﾐSｷI;デW ｷﾐデWヴ┗Wﾐデｷﾗﾐげゲ ヮﾗデWﾐデｷ;ﾉ ヮWヴ デｴWｷヴ 
new pragmatist perspective.  
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deepen appreciation of negatives by further considering worries about accounting and 
related phenomena, especially concerning transparency and accountability, expressed by 
writers (e.g. Messner, 2009; Roberts, 2009) who have engaged in critical analysis of 
accounting and related practices. We then return to articulating appreciation of the 
multifaceted character of accounting and related phenomena. 
Doubts and anxieties about accounting and related phenomena 
Manifestations of accounting, accountability and auditing are not by their nature 
straightforward phenomena. To elaborate, we may first appreciate that such manifestations, 
as indeed manifestations of the law, always occur in a context. While abstract principles may 
be employed to provide a rationale for their mobilisation, construction, extension or 
modification, these phenomena always occur in a context of considerable complexity that is 
difficult to grasp. And, in practice, accounting and related phenomena may follow and 
engender complex and ambivalent trajectories, with consequences that are to an extent 
different from the intended and anticipated. 
Theoretical and empirical research provides insights into this problematic. We can articulate 
some of the key insights helping us critically reflect upon efforts to ostensibly increase 
transparency, enhance accountability and impact behaviour to better well-being through 
various mechanisms of accounting and related phenomena (the focus of our empirical 
analysis). We should initially acknowledge that it is even the case that such efforts may from 
an early stage function more as tokenism, or even fraud. More generally, something less than 
an unambiguously positive impact may follow the efforts (see Peters, 1993; Power & Laughlin, 
1996; Power, 1997; Strathern, 2000; Larrinaga-Gonzalez & BWHHｷﾐｪデﾗﾐが ヲヰヰヱき OげD┘┞Wヴが ヲヰヰヱき 
Eisenberg, 2006; Hood & Heald, 2006; Christensen & Langer, 2009; Etzioni, 2010; Fenster, 
2012, 2015; Bovens et al., 2014; Gallhofer & Haslam, 2017; Öge, 2014, 2016; Mejía Acosta, 
2009, 2013; Ejiogu et al., 2018).  
It has been elaborated how disclosure in the public realm cannot be easily restricted in terms 
of who uses it and for what purposes (see Stiglitz, 2002; Stiglitz & Walsh, 2006). This is 
something that might facilitate countering of more negative or problematic regulatory 
phenomena in that negative intents and effects (from a critical perspective) of regulatory 
interventions can thereby be countered (see Gallhofer & Haslam, 2003, 2007; Gallhofer et al., 
2006; Bebbington et al., 2014). It may also facilitate countering, undermining and displacing 
the more progressive and positive by those, for instance, whose projects are scarcely 
progressive (see Sikka, 2006, on the potential of internet disclosure). 
Competing and conflicting interests may to varying degrees capture a nascent or introduced 
accounting-type practice, suverting socially progressive intentions. Those ostensibly rendered 
visible and accountable may to some extent capture or modify accounting and related 
mechanisms (e.g. as in けヴWｪ┌ﾉ;デﾗヴ┞ I;ヮデ┌ヴWげが see Sikka, 2006; Spence, 2009; Cortese, 2011; 
Crawford et al., 2014; Öge, 2014; Mejía Acosta, 2009, 2013; Ejiogu et al., 2018). Law-makers 
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and standard-setters may effectively lean towards interests of particular constituencies 
(including those ostensibly rendered visible/accountable). This could reflect a perceived 
overlapping of interests of regulator and regulated from a broad regulatory perspective (e.g. 
one stressing national, local and/or powerful economic interests, which might be prioritised 
over global justice) (see Gendron et al., 2001; Gallhofer & Haslam, 2003; Chiapello &  Mejdad, 
2009).  
Accounting and related practices emerging as influential may displace alternative practices 
(e.g., alternative State, quasi-state and/or professional regulations, forms of counter 
accounting, substantive critical investigation and practices of companies who might have 
been positively influenced more by pressures from their communities or even held 
themselves to higher accountability standards) (Power, 1997; Strathern, 2000; Curtin & 
Meijer, 2006; Christensen & Langer, 2009; Etzioni, 2010; Fenster, 2012; Meijer, 2013; Ejiogu 
et al., 2018). This could to some extent undermine ostensible positive intentions: e.g., if 
stakeholders placed too much trust in institutions, or investigative journalism for civil society 
was reduced due to it being perceived that a legal or quasi-legal practice was in place, or if 
the State rolled back other regulations to negative effect (see Power, 1997; Fenster, 2012; 
Ejiogu et al., 2018). For some, tヴ;ﾐゲヮ;ヴWﾐI┞げゲ effectiveness depends on contextual factors 
such as other regulatory systems (Mejia Acosta, 2009, 2013; Öge, 2014, 2016). 
Manifest accountings may be bolstered if reflecting professional expertise and language and 
legal authority. This may render them difficult to challenge in the public realm including by 
user constituencies, and including where the practices (perhaps reflecting specialist language, 
see Gallhofer & Haslam, 1993) are difficult to understand (see Bromwich & Hopwood, 1992; 
Power & Laughlin, 1996; Power, 1997; Meijer, 2013; Bovens et al., 2014; Ejiogu et al., 2018). 
And, established practices may lead key constituents to assume all is in order and fail to 
critically question what is ostensibly accounted for and/or audited. Practices may not be 
challenged, being presumed sound. Beyond power arising in some contexts from association 
with the law and expertise, there is the possibility practices like accounting can gain power by 
resonating with prevailing cultural preferences (e.g. where acIﾗ┌ﾐデゲ ;ヴW ┗;ﾉ┌WS ;ゲ けa;Iデゲげ, 
けﾗHﾃWIデｷ┗Wげ ﾗヴ けﾐ┌ﾏWヴｷI;ﾉげぶ ふG;ﾉﾉｴﾗaWヴ & Haslam, 1991; Loft et al., 2006; Chiapello & Medjad, 
2009; Humphrey et al., 2009; Durocher et al., 2007; Crawford et al., 2014). A danger is that 
accountings may be relied upon even where the assurances they suggest may be somewhat 
illusory or gross simplification based perhaps on narrow conceptions of transparency, 
displacing wider critical investigation (Gallhofer & Haslam, 1991; Roberts, 1991; Power, 1997; 
Roberts, 2002; Jos & Tompkins, 2004; Fenster, 2015; Öge, 2016).  
Researchers have elaborated how imposing formal accountability-type systems, most 
obviously by law but more generally in organisational/social interaction, involves ethical 
issues and suggests problematic possibilities (see Fox & Miller, 1995; Strathern, 2000; Arendt, 
2003; Bevir, 2004; Hood & Heald, 2006; Etzioni, 2010; Fenster, 2012, 2015; Meijer, 2013; 
Bovens et al., 2014)く NWｪ;デｷ┗W SｷﾏWﾐゲｷﾗﾐゲ ﾗa けﾃ┌ヴｷSｷaｷI;デｷﾗﾐげ ;ゲ ┌ﾐSWヴゲデﾗﾗS H┞ IヴｷデｷI;ﾉ scholars 
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on law and governance (e.g. as where a formal prescription or legal rule becomes overly 
dominant, restricting beneficial social outcomes) are here included (see Teubner, 1987; 
Laughlin & Broadbent, 1993; Power & Laughlin, 1996; Roberts, 2002). Accounting and 
auditing practices may amount to けtick-boxげ exercises overly detached from the substance or 
spirit of their mobilisation (Power, 1997). Through framing and design, they may impact on 
auditee behaviour to problematic effect (Power, 1996). Some worry about implications of not 
trusting or negatives of a blame culture, the dangers of practices becoming synoptic policing 
tools and overly limiting autonomy (see Scott, 2000; Strathern, 2000; OげNWｷﾉﾉが ヲヰヰヲが ヲヰヰヶき 
Dubnick, 2003; Eisenberg, 2006; Dubnick & Yang, 2011; Meijer, 2013; Bovens et al., 2014).  
Messner (2009) draws upon B┌デﾉWヴげゲ ┘ﾗヴﾆ (see Butler, 2005) to inquire into the limits the 
accountable self faces when giving an account.  The accountor (rendering the account) may 
be unclear as to the reasons for their actions. Further, what can become a burden of 
accountability can colonize accountor conduct in problematic ways. Expecting the accountor 
to be responsible and accountable for multiple conflicting things may be ethically 
questionable. And the mode or medium of accountability is usually scarcely of the accountorげゲ 
own making (Messner, 2009).11 While Messner focuses on accountabilityげゲ ﾉｷﾏｷデゲ, Roberts 
(2009), also referring to Butler, articulates similar insights about transparency and emphasises 
problematic issues involved in translating transparency/accountability into practice, e.g. 
measurement issues (see Fung et al., 2007). Such matters may have differing levels of 
significance and meaning in different cultures (on accounting, see Evans, 2004). 
Further, initiatives mobilising accountability and related practices are costly. Aside from more 
obvious direct costs involved are possible indirect impacts, e.g., on socio-economic 
motivations and activities. Costs may here fall disproportionately on particular types of 
companies or countries and potentially their citizens (see insights in: Zeff, 1978; Zhang, 2007; 
Etzioni, 2010; Leuz & Wysocki, 2016; on extractives, see Cortese et al., 2009). 
For Power (1997), these various negative aspects or possibilities have in substantive respects 
scarcely halted the influence of accounting/auditing practices. Where these practices have 
been found somehow wanting, e.g. vis-à-vis financial failings, crises or more generally poor 
performance, so strong is their normative underlying image that the proposed remedy (often 
followed) is more accounting, accountability and auditing mobilisation.12 Where accounting 
and related practices are directly tainted by scandal this often leads to some questioning and 
reforming (perhaps temporary) of these practices, even on their extension, but the 
questioning has tended to be constrained, being bound up in the intensity of a crisis and need 
to act (Gallhofer & Haslam, 1991; Power, 1997).  
                                                          
11 This involves relative rather than absolute influence. Politics is pervasive and effective negotiation and 
mediation complex (Norval, 2009). DWデWヴﾏｷﾐｷﾐｪ ;IIﾗ┌ﾐデ;Hｷﾉｷデ┞げゲ ﾐ;デ┌ヴW ;ﾐS ゲIﾗヮW ヴWケ┌ｷヴWゲ WデｴｷI;ﾉ ﾃ┌SｪWﾏWﾐデ 
;ゲ デﾗ けaﾗヴ ┘ｴﾗﾏが aﾗヴ ┘ｴ;デげ vis-à-vis the reporting organizationげゲ ┌ﾐSWヴﾉ┞ｷﾐｪ ideology (Crawford et al., 2018). 
12 E.g., after the 2008 crisis, calls from regulatﾗヴゲ ;ﾐS ;I;SWﾏｷIゲ デﾗ ヴWaﾗヴﾏ E┌ヴﾗヮWげゲ audit market to preclude 
conflicts of interest and introduce greater competition engendered extensions of auditing, accounting standards 
and audit law (Sikka, 2009; Sikka et al., 2009; Humphrey et al., 2011; European Commission, 2010).  
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We need to take negative aspects and possibilities seriously. Concurrently, there is a danger, 
in appreciating the negatives predominant in critical discourse, of overlooking or 
misinterpreting progressive actualities and potentialities of accounting and related systems. 
Let us return to these in seeking to articulate the more balanced position.  
Continuing to appreciate the positive and progressive: theoretical refinement  
If one hears anecdotal calls to even end accounting and related practices (noted in Gallhofer 
and Haslam, 2003, 2017), these are presumably akin to hyperbole and irony rather than 
substantive argument. Gallhofer & Haslam (2003, 2017), analysing branches of accounting 
discourse, notably of social and environmental accounting discourse, suggest that it is as if 
particular types of accounting (conventional, mainstream) are seen as absolutely corrupted 
but for them such allusion is problematic, akin to Iヴ┌SW けゲデヴ;┘-ﾏ;ﾐﾐｷﾐｪげ (they emphasise here 
the crucial issue of accounting delineation). A close reading of texts highlighting doubts and 
anxieties about accounting-type systems suggests typically that they are not one-sided. The 
けﾐWｪ;デｷ┗Wげ literature more properly tends to emphasize the need to limit or balance different 
tendencies and does not negate accounting-type systems entirely (Roberts, 2017, explicitly 
supports positive dimensions of accountability in particular contexts, including vis-à-vis 
countering corruption). The argumentation involves more relative emphasis and reference to 
particular types of the focal phenomena rather than more extreme universal and absolutist 
positions. And in the critical theoretical literature, one finds explicit emphasis on 
;IIﾗ┌ﾐデ;Hｷﾉｷデ┞げゲ ヮﾗゲｷデｷ┗W ヮﾗデWﾐデｷ;ﾉ (see Bronner, 1994; Florini, 2007; as well as Gallhofer & 
Haslam, 1997, 2003). From this, one can argue that while accounting-type phenomena (and 
dimensions thereof) are problematic in various ways, too little of their presence and 
functioning in society would also be problematic. 
None of the doubts and anxieties suggest, then, leaving aside issues of feasibility, that 
jettisoning, or not mobilising, accounting and related practices (and the law) equals the best 
way forward. Yet, we might note here that aspects of the appreciation of doubts and anxieties 
(which might be exaggerated in policy discourse) may be used to try to negate socially 
progressive accounting and related developments in practice. The appreciation rather 
indicates the need to critically assess particular accounting-type manifestations carefully, to 
explore the detail (of positives and negatives) to better assess and construct ways forward 
aligned with the desired social aim.  We suggested above that there may be particular reasons 
to question an accounting supported by or associated with the law but, regarding the 
theoretical concern to look for positives and negatives including in the detail, those principles 
are the same whatever the type of accounting focused upon. 
Gallhofer et al. (2015) summarise a critical and socio-analytical model (outlined earlier in 
Gallhofer & Haslam, 1991) that they deem useful for framing empirical research into 
accounting practice in this regard. They stress the need to understand the dynamics in context 
ﾗa ;IIﾗ┌ﾐデｷﾐｪ WﾉWﾏWﾐデゲ ゲ┌Iｴ ;ゲ ;IIﾗ┌ﾐデｷﾐｪげゲ IﾗﾐデWﾐデが aﾗヴﾏが ;┌ヴ; (how it is perceived in 
ゲﾗIｷWデ┞ぶが ┌ゲ;ｪW ふ┘ｴﾗ ┌ゲWゲ ｷデ ;ﾐS ｴﾗ┘ぶ ;ﾐS デｴW けﾐWデ┘ﾗヴﾆげ ﾗa ;Iデﾗヴゲ ;ヴﾗ┌ﾐS ;IIﾗ┌ﾐデｷﾐｪく Tｴｷゲ 
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defines a field of interactions consequential in terms of shifts in progressive/regressive 
SｷﾏWﾐゲｷﾗﾐゲ ﾗa ;IIﾗ┌ﾐデｷﾐｪげゲ a┌ﾐIデｷﾗﾐｷﾐｪく13 Their framing applies to any accounting 
phenomenon and related practice, including accounting advocated as progressive from a 
critical perspective (see suggestions for ;ﾐ;ﾉ┞ゲｷゲ ﾗa けIﾗ┌ﾐデWヴげ ;ﾐS けゲｴ;Sﾗ┘げ ;IIﾗ┌ﾐデｷﾐｪ ｷﾐ 
Gallhofer et al., 2015; Gallhofer & Haslam, 2017).14  
Following Gallhofer & Haslam (2017), the critical researcher seeks to theorise the 
emancipatory/progressive and repressive/regressive forces running through accounting in 
context, at particular moments and over time, and seeks to transform the focal object (and 
context) towards a better vision of its manifestation/functioning. Gallhofer & Haslam (2003, 
2017) see here their theorising as praxis while they also promote various interventions to 
progressively change things in society (we draw from this later). They emphasise the need for 
more empirical work to illuminate, e.g., what is problematic, what is progressive and what 
can be rescued in the domain delineated around the focal accounting object (or related 
practice). Informed by reflection on Habermas, Power & Laughlin (1996) conclude similarly: 
けぐデｴW SｷゲデｷﾐIデｷﾗﾐ HWデ┘WWﾐ ;IIﾗ┌ﾐデｷﾐｪ ヮヴ;IデｷIWゲ ;ゲ けSｷゲデﾗヴデｷﾐｪげ ﾗヴ けWﾐ;Hﾉｷﾐｪげ I;ﾐ ﾐW┗Wヴ HW ﾏ;SW 
absolutely but is nevertheless a constant problem that must be worked out in empirical 
researIｴぐげ (p. 462)(see also Walker, 2014)15. We now turn to our case. 
A CASE ANALYSIS: REALISING THE POTENTIAL OF ACCOUNTING AND RELATED PHENOMENA 
TO ENHANCE TRANSPARENCY AND ACCOUNTABILITY ON BEHALF OF THE WORLDげS POOR? 
We here explore our focal accounting manifestation, the accounting law written into Chapter 
10 (with its equivalent Transparency Directive provisions), 16 in relation to our theoretical 
framing and its concern to uncover multifaceted dimensions of accounting. In our analysis, 
we: provide key contextual appreciation by elaborating upon developments leading to 
Chapter 10 and developments paralleling and/or overlapping with it; critically assess the legal 
text transposed in the UK; review comments submitted to a consultation when the law was 
being transposed and related interviewee perceptions; analyse industry guidelines; critically 
assess early reporting by extractives. Throughout, we reflect insights from key constituencies 
                                                          
13 Gallhofer & Haslam (2017) promote developing critical orientation in various theorisings and, in the critical 
theoretical tradition, draw from these in refining articulation of progressive/regressive dimensions. 
14 If counter and shadow accountings (Gallhofer et al., 2006; Bebbington et al., 2014), in principle, challenge 
elements of the established order (typically contrasting with legislative provisions, see Spence, 2009), here there 
is ostensibly a parallel challenging through the law itself of prior business positions for progressive purposes, 
meriting analysis. 
15 Gallhofer et al. (2015), following new pragmatism, seek to uncover here emancipatory insights through 
appreciating and engaging with different ways in which accountings are developed and administered (see also 
Vinnari & Dillard, 2016). 
16 As noted, some may find it problematic to I;ﾉﾉ デｴW aﾗI┌ゲ け;IIﾗ┌ﾐデｷﾐｪげ. We do so here partly following Gallhofer 
et al. (2015), who articulate possibilities of accounting delineation that would clearly include the reports 
prescribed by Chapter 10, and much social accounting and related discourse, which promotes quite a broad 
け;IIﾗ┌ﾐデｷﾐｪげ SWﾉｷﾐW;デｷﾗﾐ ふゲWW “pence, 2009; Catchpowle & Smyth, 2016; Lehman, 2017). We are not, however, 
in using this delineation or categorisation, implying that the focal phenomenon has the same status or 
characteristics as conventional mainstream accounting: e.g., we later emphasisW デｴW aﾗI;ﾉ ヮｴWﾐﾗﾏWﾐﾗﾐげゲ 
relatively weak regulation (including vis-à-vis auditing).  
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on the accounting law, informed by interpretation of interviewee transcriptions. We then 
discuss and analyse the case in more explicit theoretical terms before offering concluding 
comments. 
Context 
Chapter 10 ostensibly aimed to increase transparency, enhance accountability and impact 
behaviour to better well-being, ヴWaﾉWIデｷﾐｪ Iｷ┗ｷﾉ ゲﾗIｷWデ┞げゲ ﾉﾗﾐｪ-fought campaign to introduce 
CBCR for extractives (PWYP & Global Witness, 2005; Tax Justice Network, 2006; Gallhofer & 
Haslam, 2007; Murphy, 2012; European Commission, 2013; Sikka, 2013; Litvinoff, 2015; 
Transparency International, 2015; Baudot & Cooper, 2016; Crawford, 2017). The European 
Commission (2013) especially highlighted the ﾉ;┘げゲ enabling benefits for stakeholders:   
ぷIデ ┘ｷﾉﾉ ;ﾉﾉﾗ┘へぐIommunities to better demand that government accounts for how the money has 
been spent locallyぐ[and]ぐcivil society will be in a position to question whether the contracts 
entered into between government and extractiveぐcompaniesぐぷｴ;┗Wへぐdelivered adequate value 
to society and government. 
And that this would be achieved through EU law requring: 
"ぐ large extractive and logging companies to report the payments they make to governments (the 
so called country by country reporting-CBCR). Reporting would also be carried out on a project 
H;ゲｷゲが ┘ｴWヴW ヮ;┞ﾏWﾐデゲ ｴ;┗W HWWﾐ ;デデヴｷH┌デWS デﾗ ゲヮWIｷaｷI ヮヴﾗﾃWIデゲく ぐ The new disclosure 
requirement will improve the transparency of payments made to governments all over the world 
by the extractive and logging industries. Such disclosure will provide civil society in resource-rich 
countries with the information needed to hold governments to account for any income made 
デｴヴﾗ┌ｪｴ デｴW W┝ヮﾉﾗｷデ;デｷﾗﾐ ﾗa ﾐ;デ┌ヴ;ﾉ ヴWゲﾗ┌ヴIWゲざ. 
Thus, quite explicitly, transparency and accountability is proposed to help alleviate local 
poverty and overcome the resource curse: such explicit intention is already a positive. The 
curse (see PWYP & Global Witness, 2005; Oranje & Parham, 2009) is one aspect of the wider 
issue of global poverty and under-development.  If continuing basic problems globally are 
shocking then especially so is this curse, whereby resource-rich countries somehow find 
themselves worse off due to being resource-rich, an extreme instance of the more general 
phenomenon alluded to, i.e. poor performance vis-à-vis expectations for a country relatively 
richly endowed with extractables. Numerous studies have explored this problematic (e.g., 
Dollar & Easterly, 1999; Gary & Karl, 2003; Ferguson, 2005; Craig & Porter, 2006; Chang, 2007; 
Humphreys et al., 2007; Moss, 2007; Collier, 2008; Woods, 2008; Kolstad & Søreide, 2009; 
Gillies, 2010; Arakan Oil Watch, 2012; Cunguara & Hanlon, 2012; Robinson & Acemoglu, 2013; 
Dowden, 2014; Burgis, 2015), some calling for greater accountability and transparency in 
suggesting ways forward. Legal and accounting practicalities of such calls have until relatively 
recently scarcely been appreciated or elaborated (Crawford, 2017). 
Calls for greater accountability and transparency have here focused substantively on key 
areas.  There is an interest in making clearer the socio-economic impact of extractive activities 
undertaken in countries upon the countries themselves. More specifically, there is concern to 
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disclose how much extractives-generated money is received directly by every relatively 
resource-ヴｷIｴ Iﾗ┌ﾐデヴ┞げゲ ｪﾗ┗WヴﾐﾏWﾐデs and by whom the payments (e.g. taxes, fees, licenses 
and royalties) are made (in as granulated detail as can be useful). Further, there is concern to 
disclose how these government revenues are then spent by governments to facilitate 
evaluation. Such transparency is intended to potentially raise further issues, including in the 
public domain, entailing accountability relations (e.g., if corporate payments were found 
scant or government spending was controversial regarding its size and/or character) 
(Gallhofer & Haslam, 2007). While such a transparency system might in practice be fraught 
with difficulties and imperfections, commentators deem it considerably better than no 
regulatory prescription of transparency, a serious constraining lack (e.g., as reflected in 
deficiencies of investigative journalism, which has found accessing information difficult).  
A prominent campaigner vis-à-vis seeking greater accountability and transparency here is 
PWYP.17 PWYP formed a global coalition of civil society organizations け┌ﾐｷデWS ｷﾐ デｴWｷヴ I;ﾉﾉ aﾗヴ 
;ﾐ ﾗヮWﾐ ;ﾐS ;IIﾗ┌ﾐデ;HﾉW W┝デヴ;Iデｷ┗W ゲWIデﾗヴげ (http://www.publishwhatyoupay.org/our-
work/mandatory-disclosures/). With support from George Soros and the Open Society 
Foundation, it pursues:  
 ぐ; ┘ﾗヴﾉS ┘ｴWヴW ;ﾉﾉ Iｷデｷ┣Wﾐゲ HWﾐWaｷデ aヴﾗﾏ デｴWｷヴ ﾐ;デ┌ヴ;ﾉ ヴWゲﾗ┌ヴIWゲが デﾗS;┞ ;ﾐS デﾗﾏﾗヴヴﾗ┘ぐ; ﾏﾗヴW 
transparent and accountable extractive sector, that enables citizens to have a say over whether 
their resources are extractedぐhowぐand how their extractive revenues are spent (PWYP, 2017).  
PWYP advocates transparent CBCR of payments to governments as crucial for stakeholders 
concerned to assess extractive operationsげ ｷﾏヮ;Iデ on the well-being of relatively resource-
rich countries (e.g., Angola, Indonesia, Kazakhstan, Venezuela, Nigeria, Algeria, Sudan and 
Equatorial Guinea). They have sought to advance towards confronting and mobilising legal 
and accounting practicalities of the enhanced accountability and transparency vision (PWYP 
& Global Witness, 2005; Oranje & Parham, 2009; Crawford, 2017). Collaborating with legal 
and accounting experts, PWYP have sought to influence prominent accounting and disclosure 
policy-makers internationally, notably the International Accounting Standards Board (IASB), 
the US Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB) and the US Securities and Exchange 
Commission (SEC), towards the more disaggregated disclosures that would help realise the 
vision. Specifically, PWYP actively sought to shape two accounting standards (International 
Financial Reporting Standard 6, IFRS6, on W┝デヴ;Iデｷ┗Wゲげ accounting, and IFRS8, on segmental 
reporting) and policies of stock exchanges and governments (Gallhofer & Haslam, 2007; 
Crawford et al., 2014; Baudot & Cooper, 2016). 
PWYP have ostensibly impacted in the domains of their engagement. In accounting policy-
making, appreciation of the IFRS8 case even bears witness to this (Gallhofer & Haslam, 2007; 
Crawford, 2017). The alternative standard for IFRS8 submitted (following IASB consultation 
criteria, requiring comments on proposed standards or changes thereto to be in line with the 
IASB frameworkげゲ ｷﾐ┗Wゲデﾗヴ ヮWヴゲヮWIデｷ┗W) by PWYP and supported by some 300 members of 
their coalition (including charities like Oxfam and Save the Children), received substantial 
                                                          
17 In 2012, PWYP expanded their remit from revenue transparency to all value chain steps (their 2020 vision). 
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publicity, with The Guardian, The Financial Times and Accountancy Age lending the initiative 
support and Soros making explicit that as an investor he supported the PWYP-formulated 
standard. Two IASB members (a significant number) went on record expressing their view 
that PWYPげゲ SWゲｷヴWS Iｴ;ﾐｪWゲ ┘WヴW けSWIｷゲｷﾗﾐ-┌ゲWa┌ﾉげ aﾗヴ ｷﾐ┗Wゲデﾗヴゲく Aヴｪ┌;Hﾉ┞が デｴW ヮﾗﾉｷデｷI;ﾉ 
ﾗヮヮﾗヴデ┌ﾐｷデ┞ ゲデヴ┌Iデ┌ヴW ﾗa IA“Bげゲ S┌W ヮヴﾗIWゲゲ ┘;ゲ in substantive ways ｴﾗゲデｷﾉW デﾗ PWYPげゲ 
campaign (Crawford, 2017). If IASB decided by majority to reject PWYPげゲ proposal, opting for 
a most permissive revised けゲデ;ﾐS;ヴSげ (SWWﾏWS H┞ IA“B デﾗ ;ゲゲｷゲデ IA“Bげゲ ;ｷﾏゲ to align with FASB), 
IASB acknowledged further consideration should be given to the issue, increasing interaction 
with the UN and the International Financial Institutions. Gallhofer & Haslam (2007) also report 
some IASB members understanding IA“Bげゲ SWIｷゲｷﾗﾐ as けヴW;ﾉヮﾗﾉｷデｷﾆげ ;ﾐS expressing hope that 
legislation might intervene to yield the desired disaggregated disclosures.18 
One aspect of the relationship between IASB standards and the law indicates a further area 
of PWYP influence. From 2005, the EU required all companies listed on EU stock exchanges 
to comply with IASB standards. In turn, the EU had to ratify new/revised IASB standards prior 
to their becoming mandatory. Often effectively rubber-stamping, this was not so with IFRS8 
(Crawford et al., 2010; Crawford et al., 2014). PWYP asks combined at this juncture with 
prominent investment bodies seeing the revised standard as a backward step, prompted 
Members of the European Parliament to require the European Commission (EC) to undertake 
a Europe-specific potential effects assessment before endorsing (European Commission, 
2007; Crawford et al., 2014). While IFRS8 was subsequently ratified, this event increased 
pressure for EU-level legislation to reflect the needs of users including civil society; the IFRS8 
endorsement instrument specifically called for relevant CBCR disclosures by extractives 
(European Parliament, 2007; Crawford et al., 2010).   
Meanwhile, lobbying activity in the US led to provisions being inserted into the Obama 
administrationげゲ Dodd-Frank Act (s.1504), so that desired disaggregated disclosures would be 
required of US-listed extractives (Dodd-Frank, 2010). The US legislation has so far 
disappointed in practice. The corporate sector took legal action arresting its application: the 
powerful American Petroleum Institute (API) brought a lawsuit (Ross, 2015). The US courts 
effectively left a politically constrained Obama administration failing to re-enforce the original 
law (Baudot & Cooper, 2016). Subsequently, the Trump administration sought to abandon 
the provisions: ensuing struggle continues. 
It must be appreciated that the CBCR originally sought by PWYP and allies, when campaigning 
to influence IFRS8 (PWYP & Global Witness, 2005; see Murphy, 2012が ﾗﾐ CBC‘げゲ potential), 
was more extensive than that incorporated into Chapter 10. Chapter 10 requires reporting 
entities to disclose payments identifying the government and country to which payment is 
ﾏ;SWが け┘ｴWデｴWヴ ｷﾐ ﾏﾗﾐW┞ ﾗヴ ｷﾐ ﾆｷﾐSげ by payment types: production entitlements; taxes levied 
on income, production or profits; royalties; dividends; signature, discovery and production 
bonuses; fees and concessions (licence, rental, entry); payments for infrastructure 
improvements. The CBCR PWYP earlier campaigned for also included accruals-based 
performance and position information and non-financial disclosures (including information 
on the workforce, asset base, reserves, subsidiaries and nature of activities by country). 
                                                          
18 The IASB appears to have given CBCR in this area low priority from 2012 (Deloitte, 2012; Crawford, 2017). 
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Moreover, this was to be in the audited financial statements. However, PWYPげゲ efforts were 
subsequently overtaken by IA“Bげゲ ヴWゲヮﾗﾐゲW and the US Dodd-Frank (s.1504) developments 
(supra). S.1504 required only disclosure of payments to governments: and without audit.  
PWYPげゲ ヴWゲヮﾗﾐゲW デﾗ the ECげゲ ﾗヴｷｪｷﾐ;ﾉ Iﾗﾐゲ┌ﾉデ;デｷﾗﾐ ﾗn draft legislation (PWYP, 2011) included 
a request for audit. But a PWYP representative (personal communication, 2018) stated that 
they were:  
ぐｷﾐaﾗヴﾏWS H┞ デｴW UK ｪﾗ┗WヴﾐﾏWﾐデぐthat auditing was out ofぐquestionぐmaybe because there was 
noぐauditingぐin the Dodd-Frank Act, and perhaps because companies opposed auditing 
onぐgrounds of cost. 
If the ECげゲ Iﾗﾐゲ┌ﾉデ;デｷﾗﾐ ﾗ┗Wヴ Sヴ;aデ ﾉWｪｷゲﾉ;デｷﾗﾐ did not ask specifically whether CBCR should be 
audited, the envisaged NGO users expressed strong support for audit, e.g. arguing that:   
CBCR is more of an accounting issue than a CSR issue. It needs to be subject to the same standard 
of consistency and auditing as all other data in financial statementsぐto be credible and 
comparable (European Commission, 2011, p.21) 
This contrasts with arguments raised by preparers, e.g.:  
 
CBCR is not an accounting issue and should not be included in the audited financial statements. 
(European Commission, 2011, p.27).19 
This lack of audit requirement, together with no requirement for reconciliation to audited 
statements, is a weakness of Chapter 10.20 Currently, data in the reports cannot be 
adequately appraised for accuracy or scale/appropriateness (except alongside other 
information sources including from investigative journalism), which is clearly a limitation (we 
shall later see that some companies have voluntarily undertaken limited assurance audits or 
reconciliations to main financial statements but this does not negate what is a strong negative 
aspect of the current accounting law). If securing legislation is a strong outcome, it does 
appear to have involved compromise, meriting investigation. 
To appreciate Chapter 10, one should appreciate other relevant contextual developments 
that in some way parallel or overlap with it. Chapter 10 has parallels with EITI, the voluntary 
initiative (promoted by the UK government during the Blair administration and hence in place 
before Chapter 10) that governments and companies sign up to, agreeing to publish receipts 
aヴﾗﾏ W┝デヴ;Iデｷ┗Wゲげ ゲWIデﾗヴゲ ;ﾐS ヮ;┞ﾏWﾐデゲ ﾏ;SW ヴWｪ;ヴSｷﾐｪ W┝デヴ;Iデｷ┗W ;Iデｷ┗ｷデｷWゲく EITI ヴWケ┌ｷヴWゲ 
companies to publish information with substantive similarity to that required by Chapter 10 
but has the advantage of requiring independent reconciliation of company payments to 
                                                          
19 We acknowledge that this language (taking both quotes together) distinguishes HWデ┘WWﾐ け;IIﾗ┌ﾐデｷﾐｪげ ふヮヴﾗヮWヴが 
as it were) and CBCR/CSR reporting. In our accounting delineation these are different kinds of accounting. The 
quotes may be taken to ｷﾉﾉ┌ゲデヴ;デW ｴﾗ┘ ﾉ;ﾐｪ┌;ｪW ｷゲ ┌ゲWS ヴｴWデﾗヴｷI;ﾉﾉ┞ ｷﾐ ヮﾗﾉｷデｷI;ﾉ ;ヴｪ┌ﾏWﾐデ;デｷﾗﾐく けAIIﾗ┌ﾐデｷﾐｪげ ｷゲ 
given a status in these statements to differentiate it from other phenomena which might be termed non-
accountings or Wくｪく けヴWヮﾗヴデｷﾐｪゲげ (which actually, could, in principle, be audited of course, while reference is to 
reports not currently audited and as if that was a natural and/or proper state of affairs).  
20 The EC is conducting a post-implementation review of Chapter 10 which includes consideration of extending 
the legislation to include auditing of RPGs.  
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government receipts.21 Yet the voluntary nature of the initiative means that participation 
across industry and resource-rich countries is not assured. Further, the scope of payments to 
be disclosed is subject to agreement between civil society, industry and governments on a 
continuous basis in each separate jurisdiction. While this dialogue provides opportunities for 
the initiative to progressively develop it also can engender inconsistency between 
jurisdictions.22 And rules can be co-opted by one constituent group.23 The process, reliant on 
year-on-year trilateral agreements deciding publication dates rather than statutory deadlines, 
also raises concern over the timeliness of EITI disclosures (in practice lagging behind Chapter 
10 disclosures).  
More recently, the OECD proposed CBCR to tax authorities: Action 13, integral to its Base 
Erosion and Profit Shifting initiative (BEPS, adopted in the UK for large groups in all sectors 
with effect from 1/1/2016). If BEPS is itself ; ┗ﾗﾉ┌ﾐデ;ヴ┞ ｷﾐｷデｷ;デｷ┗Wが さゲﾗaデ ﾉ;┘ざ ;IIﾗヴSｷﾐｪ デﾗ the 
OECDが AIデｷﾗﾐ ヱン ｷゲ ヮ;ヴデ ﾗa デｴW OECDげゲ さｷﾐIﾉ┌ゲｷ┗Wざ BEPS framework and thus one of four 
minimum standards that must be adopted by countries wishing to join BEPS. Currently over 
100 countries (including the UK) have signed up to BEPS, thus committing to Action 13 
reporting (OECD, 2014). While there exists pressure for it to be so, the reporting is, however, 
not publicly available. If it was, it would in principle give users information needed to assess 
whether companies are paying appropriate amounts of tax in jurisdictions where they 
operate (beyond provinces of Chapter 10 and EITI). The lack of public transparency, including 
concerning tax authoritiesげ ┌ゲ;ｪW ﾗa デｴW S;デ; and corporate compliance with the rules, 
impacts AIデｷﾗﾐ ヱンげゲ usefulness to civil society.24 
A further development has been the passing of Capital Requirements Directive IV (CRD IV), an 
EU law (EC, Article 89a), prescribing prudential rules for banks, building societies and 
investment firms, most rules established from 1/1/2014 (FCA, 2018,  
https://www.fca.org.uk/firms/crd-iv). CRD IV requires more extensive disclosure than 
Chapter 10 for in-scope institutions. As CRD IV and Chapter 10 developed in parallel but came 
to different finishing points, questions arise over the appropriateness of regulating sector-by-
sector versus a more comprehensive basis. If this facilitates more tailored regulation 
(including beyond Western-centricity) with associated benefits, the sector-by-sector 
                                                          
21 While voluntary, EITI is influential, gathering momentum from its 2002 launch and now implemented in 52 
resource-rich countries (https://eiti.org/who-we-are#supporters). However: さTｴW UK EITI ｷゲ S┌W デﾗ HWｪｷﾐ ; ゲデ┌S┞ 
to assess the usability and comparability of the publication of company payments under the EU Transparency 
and Accountability Directive.  If the data submitted under the Directive are consistent, then they could be used 
as a lighter and timelier mechanism for collecting company data on payments to government に a more 
ゲ┞ゲデWﾏ;デｷI SｷゲIﾉﾗゲ┌ヴW ﾏWIｴ;ﾐｷゲﾏくざ ふGOXIが ヲヰヱΒぶく 
22 Some variability should be expected, however, if local contexts are to be treated seriously vis-à-vis their 
specificities. We are conscious of the problem of Eurocentric failings to appreciate cultural difference here (see 
Gallhofer & Haslam, 2003). 
23 In this regard, Ejiogu et al. (2018) appreciate how EITI can be undermined, e.g.  by presidential control of 
appointments. 
24 Insightful critique is provided in Murphy (2018), who also indicates the value of the views of the Independent 
Commission for the Reform of International Corporate Taxation (ICRICT, 2018). Arguments here indicate the 
need for better globally co-ordinated regulation of corporate taxes. Our argumentation here has the same 
critical orientation: we are exploring pragmatic ways of advancing such an agenda (not to suggest that there are 
no pragmatic elements in Murphy, 2018, or ICRICT, 2018). There are issues in taking BEPS disclosure as is and 
making it public: it was set up for internal government use for particular purposes. 
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approach also opens up possibilities of inconsistency. A point could here be made (as it could 
for EITI and Action 13) about the need to seek to ensure that any parity or convergence sought 
between initiatives is to level up rather than down. 
In the above context, we have indicated some advantages other contextual developments 
have over Chapter 10 (e.g. the reconciliation provisions of EITI and the comprehensive 
features of BEPS, which stimulate on-going debates about increasing relevant public 
disclosures, including at the EU level). There are positives and negatives in all the 
developments. Chapter 10 does, however, on the face of it constitute campaigner success as 
we write (and in terms of its potential), being legislation for transparency and accountability 
governing key corporations. But, if we focus upon it, what can we uncover about its 
construction and mobilisation in practice? Our focus is デｴW UK DWヮ;ヴデﾏWﾐデ ﾗa BI“げ 
transposition into UK law of Chapter 10, with its equivalent Transparency Directive provisions 
(EU Accounting Directive, 2013). The resulting UK Reports on Payments to Governments 
Regulations (2014) became law on 1/12/2014, requiring certain undertakings active in 
upstream oil, gas and mining extraction or primary logging industries to publish reports on 
payments (arising directly from extractive activity) made by them to governments. By the 
regulations, companies domiciled or listed in the UK (listed companies from outside the UK 
are governed by the equivalent Transparency Directive provisions25) must disclose certain 
payments to governments26 country-by-country. The UK here is an early (the first) 
implementer of the EU law, requiring disclosure for financial years starting on or after 
1/1/2015. Substantively, this appears a straightforward legal requirement.  
Critically assessing the legal text 
The UK law was substantially meant to be a direct translation of the EU directive. Yet, we 
sought to assess whether there was anything problematic in transposition, noting that: 
LWｪ;ﾉ Sヴ;aデWヴゲ ｴ;┗W ┘ｴWヴW ヮﾗゲゲｷHﾉW ┌ゲWS けIﾗヮ┞ ﾗ┌デげ aヴﾗﾏ デｴW DｷヴWIデｷ┗W H┌デ ﾗﾐ occasion deviated 
aヴﾗﾏ デｴｷゲ ;ヮヮヴﾗ;Iｴ デﾗ ｷﾏヮヴﾗ┗W ヴW;Sｷﾐｪ ;ﾐS Iﾉ;ヴｷデ┞ ﾗa デｴW UK ヴWｪ┌ﾉ;デｷﾗﾐゲぐｷデ ｷゲ W┝デヴWﾏWﾉ┞ ｷﾏヮﾗヴデ;ﾐデ 
that the regulations give as much clarity as possible. (BIS, 2014b, p. 18)27  
There are observations one can quite readily make on reading the law in context. These gain 
greater support when, for the UK case, constituency views and guidelines are considered and 
デｴW ﾉ;┘げゲ early implementation is assessed. One observation is that the lawげゲ ﾉ;ﾐｪ┌;ｪW is not 
as straightforward as one might have presumed given its basic aim to provide: 
ぐIｷデｷ┣Wﾐゲ ﾗa ヴWゲﾗ┌ヴIW-rich developing countries with the information they need to help hold their 
governments to accﾗ┌ﾐデぐ(BIS, 2014a, p.3) 
Prior to issuing the law, BIS noted conflicts over language between civil society and industry 
けｷﾐ ヴWﾉ;デｷﾗﾐ デﾗ デｴW SWaｷﾐｷデｷﾗﾐゲが ｷﾐ ヮ;ヴデｷI┌ﾉ;ヴ ┌ﾐSWヴデ;ﾆｷﾐｪが ヮ;┞ﾏWﾐデ ;ﾐS ヮヴﾗﾃWIデげ (BIS, 2014b, 
p.18). Another initial observation is to note the inclusion of size criteria, e.g. concerning 
payment size (companies domiciled or listed in the EU must disclose payments けgreater or 
                                                          
25 Article 6 Directive 2013/50/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council. 
26 Gﾗ┗WヴﾐﾏWﾐデ ﾏW;ﾐゲ け;ﾐ┞ ﾐ;デｷﾗﾐ;ﾉが ヴWｪｷﾗﾐ;ﾉ ﾗヴ ﾉﾗI;ﾉ ;┌デｴﾗヴｷデ┞ ﾗa ; MWﾏHWヴ “デ;デWぐぷｷﾐIﾉ┌Sｷﾐｪへぐ; SWヮ;ヴデﾏWﾐデが 
;ｪWﾐI┞ ﾗヴ ┌ﾐSWヴデ;ﾆｷﾐｪ IﾗﾐデヴﾗﾉﾉWS H┞ デｴ;デ ;┌デｴﾗヴｷデ┞げ ふEU AIIﾗ┌ﾐデｷﾐｪ DｷヴWIデｷ┗Wが ヲヰヱン, Article 41). 
27 The UK likes to Sヴ;aデ ﾉ;┘ゲ ｷﾐ けUK ゲデ┞ﾉWげ ふQC). 
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equal to 100,000 Euros or the equivalentげ made to governments relating to W┝デヴ;Iデｷ┗Wゲげ 
projects), which may facilitate avoiding disclosure. 
The lack of audit requirement, albeit non-compliance penalties, is also noteworthy, regarding 
which: 
ぐぷIﾗﾏﾏWﾐデ;デﾗヴゲへぐﾐﾗデWS デｴ;デ デｴWヴW ┘;ゲ ﾐﾗ ヴWケ┌ｷヴWﾏWﾐデ デﾗ ｴ;┗W W┝デヴ;Iデｷ┗W ヴWヮﾗヴデゲ ;┌SｷデWS ;ﾐS 
the use of civil and criminal penalties related to audited financial reports may add burdens to 
business as they may decide that auditing the reports is necessary to provide comfort that they 
have met legislative requirements. (BIS, 2014b, p.15) 
It is noteworthy that the law is subject to review and soon after implementation (supra) by 
the UK and at the EU level to assess usefulness. TｴW UK ｪﾗ┗WヴﾐﾏWﾐデげゲ ｷﾐデWﾐデｷﾗﾐ appears to be 
to inform the EU-level review: 
 
TheぐCommission is committed to completing a review of the directive by 21/7/18. The UK believes 
that it will be important to inform that review and therefore the government will include a three-
year review clause in the regulations. This review will allow the government to consider whether 
the regulations and associated penalties have been effective and suggest appropriate 
amendments to the Commission. (BIS, 2014b, p.18) 
Another observation from exploring the lawげゲ introduction is デｴW ｪﾗ┗WヴﾐﾏWﾐデげゲ expectation 
that supplementary guidance be produced (BIS, 2014b). TｴW ｪﾗ┗WヴﾐﾏWﾐデ けencourage[d] 
ｷﾐS┌ゲデヴ┞ ;ﾐS Iｷ┗ｷﾉ ゲﾗIｷWデ┞ デﾗ ┘ﾗヴﾆ デﾗｪWデｴWヴ デﾗ ヮヴﾗS┌IW ｪ┌ｷS;ﾐIW aﾗヴ Iﾗﾏヮ;ﾐｷWゲげ ふヮくヵぶ, being 
けIﾉW;ヴ デｴ;デ ｷデ ｷゲ ｷﾐS┌ゲデヴ┞ デｴ;デ ｷゲ HWゲデ ヮﾉ;IWS デﾗ SW┗Wﾉﾗヮ ｪ┌ｷS;ﾐIWげ ふヮくヱヰぶく LG was less equivocal 
when the process of drafting guidance started:  
 
ぐthereぐ[was]ぐdebate as to the level of inputぐcivil society would have to that guidance and I 
┘;ゲﾐげデ ;ヴﾗ┌ﾐS ;デ デｴW ｷﾐｷデｷ;ﾉ ゲデ;ｪWゲ デﾗ ﾆﾐﾗ┘ ┘ｴ;デ デｴW SW;ﾉ ┘;ゲが ┘ｴWデｴWヴ デｴW┞ ┘ﾗ┌ﾉS ｷﾐヮ┌デ ﾗヴ 
whether they would see or whether they would be consulted on the guidance...that was always a 
bone of contention. 
These points already provide insights for デｴW ;IIﾗ┌ﾐデｷﾐｪ ﾉ;┘げゲ critical appreciation and 
indicate suggestions for how the law might be improved.  
An especially interesting aspect of the initial EU law, appreciated by QC, was how the law 
SWaｷﾐWゲ けヮヴﾗﾃWIデゲげ vis-à-vis the required project-by-project reporting (adding granularity to 
CBCR28). The law allows project aggregation where projects are けゲ┌Hゲデ;ﾐデｷ;ﾉﾉ┞ ｷﾐデWヴIﾗﾐﾐWIデWSげ 
(Article 41).  However, this term is not explained in the EU law, which means legal 
interpretation is required. QC advises a range of interpretations possible, from narrow to 
broad (as relating to projects undertaken within the vicinity of others, it can be interpreted 
to cover a vast area: TC gave examples of expansive aggregations by BP across the Gulf of 
Mexico and Shell across the Niger Delta), but there is a question of refﾉWIデｷﾐｪ デｴW ﾉ;┘げゲ ゲヮｷヴｷデ. 
け“┌Hゲデ;ﾐデｷ;ﾉﾉ┞ ｷﾐデWヴIﾗﾐﾐWIデWSげ is illustrated in the DｷヴWIデｷ┗Wげゲ ヮヴW-amble (in Recital 45, which 
has no strict legal force). This may reflect controversy over the term: to get the Directive 
passed within a parliamentary timeframe, putting this in the pre-amble may have been seen 
                                                          
28 Along with CBCR of different payments to governments at the aggregate corporate level, the law requires 
disclosure of payments at the level of company projects, offering greater granularity and allowing civil society 
to contrast payments from a particular region (nesting the project) ┘ｷデｴ デｴ;デ ヴWｪｷﾗﾐげゲ ヮﾗ┗Wヴデ┞. 
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as expedient compromise (QC). Interestingly, Recital 45げゲ illustration was taken into the UK 
lawげゲ main body at pp.5-6 (raising questions about this aspect of the UK law).29 The 
illustration, considering the ﾉ;┘げゲ けstrict letterげ, may not effectively discourage some from 
aggregating expansively. 
Interviewees with TC and LG suggested attempts at regulatory capture here. Initially, civil 
society wanted contract-by-contract reporting (the more granularity the better vis-à-vis 
assessing flows, alongside particular areas of both poverty and extractive activity30), whereas 
industry saw this very negatively ふけIﾗゲデﾉ┞げぶ. Industry tended to favour aggregating payments 
even where accepting CBCR. The substantially interconnected clause was introduced to avoid 
what industry saw as (and the EC acknowledged to be) excessive burden on companies with 
thousands of contracts and sub-contracts (sub-contracting being common in the extractives 
industry). But the project-by-project compromise as inserted does not appear to have 
satisfied any party well. IR preferred a clearer definition of けprojectげ and maintained project-
by-project reporting could also be very onerous for many companies (especially if audit 
requirements were added). TC saw the project-by-project regulation as unsatisfactory, 
exploitable by industry given lack of precise tie-┌ヮ デﾗ デｴW ﾉ;┘げゲ ゲヮｷヴｷデ (and given the difficulties 
of unravelling contesting practices). 
Reviewing comments submitted as the law was in process and related interviewee perceptions  
BIS invited comment on a discussion ヮ;ヮWヴ けUK ｷﾏヮﾉWﾏWﾐデ;デｷﾗﾐ ﾗa デｴW EU AIIﾗ┌ﾐデｷﾐｪ 
Directive: Chapter 10: E┝デヴ;Iデｷ┗W ｷﾐS┌ゲデヴｷWゲ ヴWヮﾗヴデｷﾐｪげ (BIS, 2014a). This reflected a limited 
autonomy that the UK government had in transposing the law: autonomy being in principle 
confined to the nature of any penalties and the precise timing of the ﾉ;┘げゲ introduction. It 
also helped get stakeholder positions on record: civil society expressed support for early 
implementation and the penalties suggested by government; industry claimed the penalties 
excessive and preferred the law implemented later. 31 comment letters were received from: 
14 extractives; 3 industry representative groups; 2 professional bodies; 2 Big4 accountancy 
firms, 9 civil society organisations and 1 all party parliamentary group. It is helpful to review 
these submissions including vis-à-vis the production of industry guidance (subter). Especially 
when analysing comments alongside interviewee perceptions, one sees a situation where 
government appears to decide on the law in the face of conflicting and passionately held civil 
society and industry views. 
Civil society submissions were substantial and tended to support the law and its principles 
linked to NGO aims.31 They stressed swift implementation crucial to avoid costs to both: 
Citizens of many resource-ヴｷIｴ SW┗Wﾉﾗヮｷﾐｪ Iﾗ┌ﾐデヴｷWゲぐぷ┘ｴﾗ ;ヴWへぐﾐﾗデ I┌ヴヴWﾐデﾉ┞ ヴWIWｷ┗ｷﾐｪ デｴW a┌ﾉﾉ 
benefit of their natural resouヴIW ┘W;ﾉデｴぐぷ;ﾐSへぐｷﾐ┗Wゲデﾗヴゲ ｷﾐ UK regulated markets by delaying 
                                                          
29 For QC, a better approach would have prefaced the wording at pp.5-ヶ ┘ｷデｴ けゲ┌Hゲデ;ﾐデｷ;ﾉ ｷﾐデWヴIﾗﾐﾐWIデｷﾗﾐ 
encompassesげ (indicating a particular illustration).  
30 This view is not shared across civil society. In a currently partially transcribed interview with a prominent tax 
campaigner, the view was expressed that this data may not be readily useable.  
31 PWYP returned a 36-page consultation response, supported by individual letters from eight international 
NGOs campaigning for extractive transparency (ABC Colombia, Cafod, Christian Aid, Global Witness, ONE, 
Revenue Watch, Tearfund and Transparency International). 
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access to information which could inform investment allocation decisions and help mitigate risk 
(PWYP, 2014) 
Civil society stressed implementation would much benefit けｷﾐデWヴﾐ;デｷﾗﾐ;ﾉ Wケ┌ｷデ┞げ H┌デ ;ヴｪ┌ed 
that certain companies downplayed benefits while exaggerating compliance costs, 
competitive disadvantage, commercial risk and alleged legal prohibitions (arising from having 
デﾗ Iﾗﾏヮﾉ┞ ┘ｷデｴ IWヴデ;ｷﾐ Iﾗ┌ﾐデヴｷWゲげ ﾉ;┘ゲ)32 (PWYP, 2014).  LG observed, overall, that civil 
ゲﾗIｷWデ┞げゲ ﾏ;ｷﾐ ;ｪWﾐS; ┘;ゲぎ 
ぐヮ┌ゲｴｷﾐｪ ;ゲ a;ヴ ;ゲ ヮﾗゲゲｷHﾉWが ﾏ;ﾆｷﾐｪ ;ゲ ﾏ┌Iｴ ｷﾐaﾗヴﾏ;デｷﾗﾐ ;ゲ IﾉW;ヴ ;ゲ ヮﾗゲゲｷHﾉWぐヴW;ﾉﾉ┞ ┘;ﾐデWS 
ヮWﾐ;ﾉデｷWゲ デｴ;デ ┘WヴW Hｷデｷﾐｪぐ;ﾐS SｷSﾐげデ ┘;ﾐデぐｷﾐ ヮ;ヴデｷI┌ﾉ;ヴぐデｴ;デぐﾗｷﾉ Iﾗﾏヮ;ﾐｷWゲぐぷﾏｷｪｴデ HW ;HﾉW 
デﾗへぐ┘ｷｪｪﾉW ﾗ┌デぐぷﾗa ヴWケ┌ｷヴWﾏWﾐデゲへく 
Given project-by-project reporting was already a compromise for civil society vis-à-vis 
contract-by-contract and given industry expressed concerns about that compromise itself 
being too costly, civil society emphasised the value of at least (appropriate) project-level 
disaggregation. For TC, けIﾗヴヴ┌ヮデｷﾗﾐ ｴ;ヮヮWﾐゲ ;デぐヮヴﾗﾃWIデ ﾉW┗Wﾉげ ;ﾐS け; ヮヴｷﾏ;ヴ┞ ;ｷﾏ of the 
ﾉWｪｷゲﾉ;デｷﾗﾐ ｷゲ デﾗ SWデWヴ ｷﾉﾉｷIｷデ ヮ;┞ﾏWﾐデゲ ｴ;ヮヮWﾐｷﾐｪ ｷﾐ デｴW aｷヴゲデ ヮﾉ;IWげ, and:   
ぐｷa ; Iﾗﾏヮ;ﾐ┞ ﾆﾐﾗ┘ゲ デｴ;デ ; ヮ;┞ﾏWﾐデ aヴﾗﾏ ; IWヴデ;ｷﾐ ヮヴﾗﾃWIデ ｷゲ ｪﾗｷﾐｪ デﾗ HW ヮ┌デ ｷﾐ デｴW ヮ┌HﾉｷI Sﾗﾏ;ｷﾐ 
it might think twice about setting up a deal whereby the money from that deal gets divertedぐa 
really good example is Shell and Eni  [Anglo-Dutch and Italian companies, respectively] in 
Nigeri;ぐon one project calledぐoil prospecting license 245ぐｷデげゲ ﾗﾐW ﾗa デｴW ﾏﾗゲデ lucrative oil blocks 
in the west of Africa off the coast of Nigeria, they paid in 2011 $1.1bn to purchase the 
ヮヴﾗﾃWIデぐぷデｴ;デ ｷゲへぐΒヰХ ﾗa NｷｪWヴｷ;げゲ WﾐデｷヴW ;ﾐﾐ┌;ﾉ ｴW;ﾉデｴ H┌SｪWデぐデｴW┞ ﾆﾐW┘ ｷﾐ ﾗヴSWヴ デﾗ ｪWデ デｴW SW;ﾉが 
to acquire the license that the money would be Sｷ┗WヴデWSが ｷﾏﾏWSｷ;デWﾉ┞ぐｷﾐデﾗぐ;ﾐ 
;ﾐﾗﾐ┞ﾏﾗ┌ゲっﾗヮ;ケ┌W Iﾗﾏヮ;ﾐ┞ぐぷ;IIﾗ┌ﾐデへぐ“ﾗ デｴ;デげゲ ガヱくヱHﾐ aヴﾗﾏ ﾗﾐW 
ヮヴﾗﾃWIデぐぷSｷ┗WヴデWSへぐaヴﾗﾏぐpublic finances in a very poor country where a lot of people suffer from 
disease and malnutrition into a private account. Shell is being prosecuted now for that. 
One of the Big4 accountancy firms, PricewaterhouseCoopers (PwC), while prefacing their 
submission by emphasising their own commitment to transparency vis-à-vis corporate tax 
payments, expressed IﾗﾐIWヴﾐ デｴ;デ けﾏ;ﾐS;デﾗヴ┞ ヮ┌HﾉｷI SｷゲIﾉﾗsure requirements can become a 
tick-box exercise rather than enabling a clear articulation of the informationぐuseful to the 
┌ゲWヴげく   
PwC also refer to け;SSｷデｷﾗﾐ;ﾉ Iﾗゲデゲ ｷﾐ┗ﾗﾉ┗WSぐぷ┘ｴｷIｴへぐゲｴﾗ┌ﾉS ﾐﾗデ HW ┌ﾐSWヴWゲデｷﾏ;デWSげ and けデｴW 
risk of a disproportionate burden being placed on UK registered or listed entities if 
implementation results in inconsｷゲデWﾐI┞ ｷﾐデWヴﾐ;デｷﾗﾐ;ﾉﾉ┞げく They refer here to けヴW;ゲゲWゲゲﾏWﾐデげ ﾗa 
s.1504 of Dodd-Frank ;aデWヴ APIげゲ ﾉ;┘ゲ┌ｷデく TｴW┞ デｴ┌ゲ ゲデヴWゲゲ デｴ;デ けぐぷｷへデぐｷゲ ｷﾏヮﾗヴデ;ﾐデ デｴ;デ デｴW 
implementation guidance is drafted so that it is at least consistent with other jurisdictions and 
SﾗWゲ ﾐﾗデ ヮﾉ;IW Sｷゲヮヴﾗヮﾗヴデｷﾗﾐ;デW H┌ヴSWﾐ ﾗﾐ UK ヴWｪｷゲデWヴWSっﾉｷゲデWS WﾐデｷデｷWゲぐげく Tｴｷゲ IﾗﾐIWヴﾐ ┘;ゲ 
echoed by IR: 
ぐｷデげゲ ﾐﾗデ ; ﾉW┗Wﾉ aｷWﾉS HWI;┌ゲW デｴW ヴ┌ﾉWゲ ;ヴW ﾗSS ｷﾐ ┘ｴﾗ ｴ;ゲ デﾗ SｷゲIﾉﾗゲW ;ﾐS ┘ｴﾗ SﾗWゲﾐげデく TｴW 
ヴWｪ┌ﾉ;デｷﾗﾐゲ ;ヴW ﾐﾗデ ｪﾉﾗH;ﾉ ｷﾐ ﾐ;デ┌ヴWぐﾐﾗデ ｴ;ヴﾏﾗﾐｷゲWSく WW ｴ;┗W ; ゲｷデ┌;デｷﾗﾐ ﾐﾗ┘ ｷﾐ ┘ｴｷIｴが ┞ﾗ┌ ﾆﾐﾗ┘が 
デｴW U“ ｷゲ ┘ｷデｴSヴ;┘ｷﾐｪが ゲﾗ デｴWヴW ｷゲﾐげデ ; ﾉW┗Wﾉ ヮﾉ;┞ｷﾐｪ aｷWﾉS ;デ ;ﾉﾉが デｴWヴW ┘;ゲ ﾐW┗Wヴ ｪﾗｷﾐｪ デﾗ HW ﾗﾐW H┌デ 
it could have been if there were global standards, if Dodd-Frank hadぐHWWﾐぐimplemented as 
                                                          
32 E.g., API argued that China, Qatar, Cameroon and Angola would prohibit disclosure of payments to their 
governments. For PWYP (2014) and BIS (2014c), no persuasive evidence for this allegation materialised. 
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ヮﾉ;ﾐﾐWSぐ┘ｴｷIｴ ┘ﾗ┌ﾉS ｴ;┗W HWWﾐ ;ﾐ OK ヮﾉ;IW デﾗ ゲデ;ヴデ ﾗﾐ ;ﾐS デｴWﾐ ﾏ;┞HW デｴヴﾗ┌ｪｴ ﾗデｴWヴ 
international initiatives you may have brought in other countries, beyond the UK, Europe, Canada 
over time.  
However, LG countered this on the moral grounds of avoiding a race to the bottom: 
I think the viewぐwe took during this discussion is that it is the Europeans that are raising the bar, 
and therefore that would put pressure on Canada and the US to move forwardぐデｴ;デげゲ デｴW ヮﾗゲｷデｷﾗﾐ 
we were in, probably until 6 months ago. Canada pretty much mirrored what we are doing. 33 
PwC also indicate in their submission デｴW けヮﾗデWﾐデｷ;ﾉ aﾗヴ ;S┗WヴゲW IﾗﾐゲWケ┌WﾐIWゲ aﾗヴ Iﾗﾏヮ;ﾐｷWゲ 
of putting commercially sensitive data into the pubﾉｷI Sﾗﾏ;ｷﾐげ and ;ｪヴWWS ┘ｷデｴ BI“げ ゲ┌ｪｪWゲデｷﾗﾐ 
that industry should be encouraged to lead in producing best practice guidance. IR noted: 
BIS acknowledged that their experience in representing the UK in relation to chapter 10 taught 
them how little they knew ;Hﾗ┌デ デｴW ﾗｷﾉ ;ﾐS ｪ;ゲ ;ﾐS ﾏｷﾐｷﾐｪ ゲWIデﾗヴゲ ;ﾐS デｴWヴWaﾗヴWぐデｴW┞ aWﾉデ デｴW 
better approach was for those who understood the sector to come up with industry guidance that 
┘ﾗ┌ﾉS ┌ﾉデｷﾏ;デWﾉ┞ HW WﾐSﾗヴゲWS H┞ ｪﾗ┗WヴﾐﾏWﾐデぐゲﾗが IOGP ;ﾐS ICMM,34 the mining body, then were 
asked by government to developぐguidance. 
However, this industry-developed guidance was never endorsed by government, which IR felt 
was due to a けHﾉｷ┣┣;ヴS ﾗa ﾏWゲゲ;ｪWゲげ aヴﾗﾏ Iｷvil society who objected to industry guidance 
proposed on projects and joint ventures (JV) (subter): 
Jo SwinsonぐMｷﾐｷゲデWヴ ;デ デｴW デｷﾏWぐゲ;ｷS ゲｴW ┘;ゲﾐげデ ｪﾗｷﾐｪ デﾗ ｪｷ┗Wぐｪﾗ┗WヴﾐﾏWﾐデ ゲ┌ヮヮﾗヴデ ゲﾗ ｷデ ┘;ゲﾐげデ 
published. This was just before the UK elections in 2015. So, ｷデ ┘;ゲﾐげデ ヮ┌HﾉｷゲｴWS デｴWﾐ ﾃﾗｷﾐデﾉ┞ H┞ 
IOGP and ICMM. It was only subsequently published by IOGP in its own name a year later.35 
PwCげs submission also raises issuesぎ けぐIﾉ;ヴｷデ┞ ﾏ;┞ HW ヴWケ┌ｷヴWS aﾗヴ ;ﾐ ﾗヴｪ;ﾐｷゲ;デｷﾗﾐ ﾉｷゲデWS ｷﾐ 
ﾏﾗヴW デｴ;ﾐ ﾗﾐW ﾃ┌ヴｷゲSｷIデｷﾗﾐ ;ﾐS ｷa デｴWヴW ｷゲ ; けヮヴｷﾏ;ヴ┞げ ﾃ┌ヴｷゲSｷIデｷﾗﾐが ┘ｴWﾐ SWデWヴﾏｷﾐｷﾐｪ ｷa デｴW 
ﾗヴｪ;ﾐｷゲ;デｷﾗﾐ ｷゲ ｷﾐ デｴW ゲIﾗヮW ﾗa デｴW ヴWｪ┌ﾉ;デｷﾗﾐゲげく This raises the prospect that a company, e.g., 
┘ｷデｴ ; けヮヴｷﾏ;ヴ┞げ listing in Japan, could escape the regulations. 
Extractives echoed PwC. They expressed concern about basic and immediate compliance 
costs (many wanted more time), including costs of the legally prescribed electronic filing (to 
render reports user-aヴｷWﾐSﾉ┞ぶく TｴWゲW さ┘WヴW ﾉWｪｷデｷﾏ;デW IﾗﾐIWヴﾐゲざ per IR, as:  
[Industry]ぐｴ;Sﾐげデ SﾗﾐW ｷデ HWaﾗヴW ゲﾗ デｴW┞ ┘WヴW ゲヮWI┌ﾉ;デｷﾐｪぐLﾗデゲ ﾗa ;ゲゲWヴデｷﾗﾐゲ ┘WヴW ﾏ;SWぐ[by non-
industry groups]ぐデｴ;デ デｴｷゲ ｷﾐaﾗヴﾏ;デｷﾗﾐ ｷゲ W;ゲｷﾉ┞ ﾗHデ;ｷﾐ;HﾉWく Tｴ;デ I ﾆﾐﾗ┘ ｷゲ ﾐﾗデ デヴ┌WぐIﾗﾏヮ;ﾐｷWゲ ｴ;S 
to putぐin place new processes in IT systems 
However, IR, concurring with civil society, felt cost magnitudes were sometimes exaggerated: 
ぐI Sﾗ デｴｷﾐﾆ Iﾉ;ｷﾏゲ ﾗﾐ Iﾗゲデゲぐ┘WヴW IﾉW;ヴﾉ┞ ﾗﾐ ; ｴｷｪｴ WﾐSぐI ┘;ゲ ゲｴﾗIﾆWS デﾗ ゲWW ｴﾗ┘ぐ[some 
were]ぐextrapolating statements and cﾗゲデゲぐデﾗ ゲ┌Iｴ Hｷｪ ﾐ┌ﾏHWヴゲく Iデ ゲ┌ヴヮヴｷゲWゲ ﾏW ｴﾗ┘ デｴW┞ ｴad just 
                                                          
33 The US political landscape was then changing. Dodd-Fヴ;ﾐﾆげゲ ゲくヱヵヰヴ ┘;ゲ deemed threatened, a view later 
ゲデヴWﾐｪデｴWﾐWSが ┘ｷデｴ Tヴ┌ﾏヮげゲ ;Sﾏｷﾐｷゲデヴ;デｷﾗﾐ ﾗヮヮﾗゲｷﾐｪ related SEC rules early in 2017. The Brexit vote adds 
uncertainty regarding the UK ﾉ;┘げゲ a┌デ┌ヴWが ｷa tｴW UKげゲ ヴW┗ｷW┘が ┘ｴﾗゲW aｷﾐSｷﾐｪゲ indicate affinity with ours (subter), 
suggests a promising conclusion at this stage at least as far as keeping the law (BEIS, 2018). 
34 International Council on Mining and Metals. 
35 Latterly the IOGP assumed authorship. 
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taken certain numbers at face value and extrapolated that to create an extreme estimate of what 
cost would be.  
Extractives often reported that proposed penalties (similar to those for failing to properly 
prepare and file the annual report and accounts, involving criminal liability for company 
directors and civil liability for companies) were harsh and that government should show 
leniency in initial years of compliance. They variously preferred monetary penalties, leniency 
or no penalties (several argued reputational effects enough). Some argued heavy penalties 
might deter companies and reduce the foreign investment that actually tended to promote 
anti-corruption business, economic reform and capacity-building. However, direct 
Iﾗﾏヮﾉｷ;ﾐIW けIﾗゲデげ IﾗﾐIWヴﾐs, as per LG, apparently were:  
ぐSヴﾗヮヮWS Sﾗ┘ﾐ the agendaぐぷ;ゲへぐcompanies were concerned with issues around anti-
competitiveness because of the US position in partic┌ﾉ;ヴが デｴW┞ ┘WヴW IﾗﾐIWヴﾐWS ;Hﾗ┌デぐsecrecy laws 
and laws in other countries where they would be reporting on the payments made and the effect 
that would have on their staff, particularly. 
Some referred to negative prospects of reduced economic competitiveness, including 
through finding themselves conflicting with host-government laws and confidentiality 
obligations. This indicates the challenge in the context of globalization of countering the race 
to the bottom in standards and laws globally. Some companies sought to be excused from 
compliance to avoid conflict with host-government laws, and in so doing, as TC suggested, 
tried to exclude themselves from non-disclosure penalties, e.g.:  
So, what Shell and Exxon thought was that the UK has discretion over the penalties regime so why 
Sﾗﾐげデ ┘W ;ゲﾆ デｴW UK ｪﾗ┗WヴﾐﾏWﾐデ デﾗ ｷﾐデヴﾗS┌IW ; ヮWﾐ;ﾉデｷWゲ ヴWｪｷﾏW デｴ;デ ┘ﾗﾐげデ ヮWﾐ;ﾉｷゲW ┌ゲが デｴWヴW ┘ｷﾉﾉ 
be no sanctions for countries that we say have bannedぐ[disclosure]ぐTｴ;デげゲ ┘ｴ;デ デｴWy put in their 
Iﾗﾐゲ┌ﾉデ;デｷﾗﾐ ｷﾐ デｴW ゲWIデｷﾗﾐ ;Hﾗ┌デ ヮWﾐ;ﾉデｷWゲが けSﾗﾐげデ ヮWﾐ;ﾉｷゲW ┌ゲ ｷﾐ Iﾗ┌ﾐデヴｷWゲ ┘ｴWヴW ┘W Sﾗﾐげデ ┘;ﾐデ デﾗ 
SｷゲIﾉﾗゲWげぐIげﾏ ヮ;ヴ;ヮｴヴ;ゲｷﾐｪ (sic). 
QC advised that such reliance on local laws is impermissible (based on prior legal cases). And 
the UK government confirmed that the ﾉ;┘げゲ ｷﾏヮ;Iデ ;ゲゲWゲゲﾏWﾐデ unearthed no plausible 
evidence for significant conflict (BIS, 2014c), ;ﾉHWｷデ LGげゲ view that け┞ﾗ┌ I;ﾐげデ ゲWW デｴW ゲWIヴWIy 
ﾉ;┘ゲが HWI;┌ゲW デｴW┞ ;ヴW ゲWIヴWデげ.36 
Many company comments reflect views appearing in the industry guidance, indicating 
companiesげ ﾆﾐﾗ┘ﾉWSｪW ﾗa and/or affinity with the guidelines.  
Analysing the IOGP Guidelines 
It was agreed early in transposition that industry representatives would compile guidance to 
Iﾉ;ヴｷa┞ Iﾗﾏヮ;ﾐｷWゲげ ヴWヮﾗヴデｷﾐｪ ﾗHﾉｷｪ;デｷﾗﾐゲく TｴW IﾐS┌ゲデヴ┞ Guidance (IOGP, 2016) coming to be 
most influential was originally prepared by a working group of representatives of ICMM and 
IOGP (the latter subsequently being named author). The group, including representatives of 
major extractives and referred to as an IOGP-ICMM-BIS implementation guidance working 
                                                          
36 Petrofac interestingly requested clear guidance ｷﾐ ;ヴW;ゲ けゲ┌Iｴ ;ゲ ┘ｴWデｴWヴ ﾗヴ ﾐﾗデ ｷﾐデWヴWゲデ ;ﾐS ヮWﾐ;ﾉデｷWゲ 




group, indicates BI“げ ゲ┌ヮヮﾗヴデ aﾗヴ having industry guidance. As noted, BIS stopped short of 
endorsing the guidance. LG noted: 
ぐデｴWヴW ┘;ゲ Sヴ;aデ ｪ┌ｷS;ﾐIW ﾗﾐぐ[the government]ぐwebsite, there was draft guidance knocking 
aboutぐconsulted onぐnever agreed formal guidance between IOGP, government and civil society. 
This was confirmed by TC: 
Iﾐ デｴW WﾐS ぷデｴW ｪﾗ┗WヴﾐﾏWﾐデへ SｷSﾐげデ WﾐSﾗヴゲW デｴW ｷﾐS┌ゲデヴ┞ ｪ┌ｷS;ﾐIWぐぷ┘ｴｷﾉW ｷﾐS┌ゲデry 
Iﾗﾏﾏ┌ﾐｷI;デWSへぐby the way we have got our own guidance and we are about to send that round 
to every single company. 
IOGP guidance notes デｴ;デ BI“ けヴW┗ｷW┘WSげ デｴW ｪ┌ｷS;ﾐIWく TｴW ｪ┌ｷS;ﾐIW ┘;ゲ ヮヴﾗ┗ｷSWS デﾗ Iｷ┗ｷﾉ 
society representatives for feedback but the latter expressed concern about poor 
consultation over the final draft and disappointment anyway by relative failure to take into 
account their feedback. Consultation over development of guidelines was fraught, LG 
reflecting:  
I think, between the two partiesぐ[civil society and industry]ぐthere is a feeling of distrust. You 
ﾆﾐﾗ┘が I デｴｷﾐﾆ ┞ﾗ┌げヴW ;ﾉ┘;┞ゲ ｪﾗｷﾐｪ デﾗ ｪWデ デｴ;デ ┘ｷデｴ Hｷｪ oil companiesぐI デｴｷﾐﾆ デｴ;デ Iｷ┗ｷﾉ ゲﾗIｷWデ┞ aWﾉデ 
they were making real changes, it was somethingぐthey had been wanting for yearsぐI 
ヴWﾏWﾏHWヴぐデｴW ｪ┌┞ aヴﾗﾏ GﾉﾗH;ﾉ WｷデﾐWゲゲが ゲ;┞ｷﾐｪ けI have been waiting for this for ten years, or 
デ┘Wﾐデ┞ ┞W;ヴゲぐ;ﾉﾉ ﾏ┞ ┘ﾗヴﾆｷﾐｪ ﾉｷaWげ. So, they were seeing this as an absolute major change. Whereas 
ｷﾐS┌ゲデヴ┞ ゲ;┘ ｷデ ;ゲ けｷデげゲ ｪﾗﾗSが H┌デ ┘Wげ┗W ｪﾗデ デﾗ Sﾗ ｷデ ｷﾐ デｴW ヴｷｪｴデ ┘;┞ ;ﾐS ┘W Sﾗﾐげデ ┘;ﾐデ デﾗぐgive 
W┗Wヴ┞デｴｷﾐｪ ｷﾐ デｴW aｷヴゲデ ｷﾐゲデ;ﾐIWが ゲﾗ ┘W ┘ｷﾉﾉ Sﾗ ┘ｴ;デ デｴW ﾉ;┘ ゲ;┞ゲが ┘W ┘ﾗﾐげデ Sﾗ デｴW ｪﾗﾉS ゲデ;ﾐS;ヴSが 
┘W ┘ｷﾉﾉ Sﾗ ┘ｴ;デ デｴW ﾉ;┘ ヴWケ┌ｷヴWゲ ┌ゲ デﾗ Sﾗ HWI;┌ゲW デｴ;デ ｷゲ ﾗ┌ヴ ﾗHﾉｷｪ;デｷﾗﾐげく AﾐS ｷデ I;ﾏW デﾗ ; ヮﾗｷﾐデ 
where industry feltぐcivil society wanted best practice, they wanted to go furtherぐthan what the 
ﾉ;┘ ゲ;ｷSく WｴWヴW;ゲ Iｷ┗ｷﾉ ゲﾗIｷWデｷWゲ ┗ｷW┘ ┘;ゲ デｴ;デ ｷデげゲ デｴW ﾉ;┘ ﾗﾐ デｴW ヮ;ｪW ヮﾉ┌ゲ デｴW ｷﾐデWﾐデ ﾗa デｴW 
European agreements.  Now, the intents were never written down ;ﾐS デｴ;デげゲ デｴW ヮヴﾗHﾉWﾏく “ﾗが 
their aWWﾉｷﾐｪ ┘;ゲ デｴ;デ ｷﾐS┌ゲデヴ┞ ┘WヴWﾐげデ HWｷﾐｪ ;ゲ aﾉW┝ｷHﾉW ;ゲ デｴW┞ Iﾗ┌ﾉSが ┘ｴWヴW;ゲ ｷﾐS┌ゲデヴ┞ ┘as saying 
け┘W ;ヴW Sﾗｷﾐｪ ┘ｴ;デ デｴW ﾉ;┘げゲ デﾗﾉS ┌ゲ デﾗ Sﾗ ;ﾐS ┞ﾗ┌ I;ﾐげデ ;ゲﾆ ┌ゲ デﾗ Sﾗ ;ﾐ┞ﾏﾗヴWげく “ﾗ, there were 
arguments over tiny words, there were arguments over phrases, there were arguments over 
almost every part of the industry guidance. And that went quite a long way.  They were leafleting 
this building に civil society.  
TC passionately recalled meetings with government and industry to develop guidelines:  
ぐthere was a big fight between NGOゲ ;ﾐS ｷﾐS┌ゲデヴ┞ ;ﾐS ┞W;ｴ aﾗヴ ゲ┌ヴW ┘W ﾏWデ H┌デ デｴW┞ ┘WヴWﾐげデ 
positive, they were negative meetingsぐデｴW┞ ┘WヴW ┗Wヴ┞ ;S┗Wヴゲ;ヴｷ;ﾉ ┘ｷデｴ ｪﾗ┗WヴﾐﾏWﾐデ ;Iデ┌;ﾉﾉ┞ デヴ┞ｷﾐｪ 
toぐ[intervene]...   
TｴW IﾐS┌ゲデヴ┞ G┌ｷS;ﾐIW ｷﾐIﾉ┌SWゲ ｷﾐデWヴヮヴWデ;デｷﾗﾐ ﾗa けゲ┌Hゲデ;ﾐデｷ;ﾉﾉ┞ ｷﾐデWヴIﾗﾐﾐWIデWSげ IヴｷデｷIｷゲWS by 
QC.  The construct allows an ostensibly narrow set of circumstances when companies can 
デヴW;デ ﾗヮWヴ;デｷﾗﾐゲ ┘ｷデｴ ﾏ┌ﾉデｷヮﾉW ﾉｷIWﾐゲWゲ ﾗヴ ｪﾗ┗Wヴﾐｷﾐｪ Iﾗﾐデヴ;Iデゲ ;ゲ ﾗﾐW けヮヴﾗﾃWIデげ in reporting 
(supra). It has been interpreted in the guidance so as to potentially pave the way for practices 
against the spirit or a reasonable interpretation of the law. Companies might disingenuously 
aggregate payments in their reports to avoid providing substantive project-level data. TC 
ヴWﾏWﾏHWヴWS けsubstantially interconnectedげ ﾗヴｷｪｷﾐ;デｷﾐｪ (in the EU legislationげゲ Sヴ;aデｷﾐｪぶ ｷﾐ 
arguments advanced by a mining company: 
I do remember going to one meeting in the UK, Department for BusinessぐRio Tinto was thereぐI 
remember it was Rio Tinto that wanted to add to the language for a project definitionぐmy 
understanding is ｷﾐｷデｷ;ﾉﾉ┞ ｷデ ┘;ゲ さ┞ﾗ┌ ┘ｷﾉﾉ ヴWヮﾗヴデ Iﾗﾐデヴ;Iデゲざ ふデｴW aｷヴゲデ ﾉｷﾐW ﾗa デｴW ヮヴﾗﾃWIデ SWaｷﾐｷデｷﾗﾐぶ 
24 
 
but Rio Tinto said actually in some countries more developed e.g. Australia, Canada, US which have 
different regimes than your average resource-rich developing country some of our projects are 
made up of hundreds of contracts. So, if we had to report on a strictly contract-by-contract basis 
that would be too onerous for us and in some instances, this is clearly one project even if itげs made 
up of hundreds of contracts so they wanted language introduced that would give them flexibility. 
And that wasぐさゲ┌Hゲデ;ﾐデｷ;ﾉﾉ┞ IﾐデWヴIﾗﾐﾐWIデWSざが ;ゲ I ヴWﾏWﾏHWヴ ｷデ I;ﾏW aヴﾗﾏ ‘ｷﾗ Tｷﾐデﾗく 
TC stressed the phrase came from mining not oil companies:  
YWゲぐthe UK ｪﾗ┗WヴﾐﾏWﾐデぐ┘WヴW Iﾗﾐ┗Wﾐｷﾐｪ ﾏWWデｷﾐｪゲ HWデ┘WWﾐ Iｷ┗ｷﾉ ゲﾗIｷWデ┞ ;ﾐS ｷﾐS┌ゲデヴ┞ デﾗ ｪWデ 
people rﾗ┌ﾐS デｴW デ;HﾉW ;ﾐS ┘ﾗヴﾆ デｴヴﾗ┌ｪｴぐtechnicalities, for example definition of project was the 
really big kind of sticking point. But I remember being at a meeting where Rio Tinto explained they 
would like this extra sentence about substantially interconnected introduced because this reflects 
ﾗ┌ヴ ﾗヮWヴ;デｷﾗﾐゲぐif just specific to these ﾏｷﾐｷﾐｪ ヮヴﾗﾃWIデゲ デｴWﾐ デｴ;デげゲ OKぐI デｴｷﾐﾆ ｷデ ヴW;ﾉﾉ┞ ┘;ゲﾐげデ 
meant for oil companiesぐ[and]ぐthis additional language allowed them to exploit that ambiguity 
to aggregateぐ[artificially]ぐprojects.  
Further, by IOGP (2016), payments made on behalf of participants in JVs by the operator 
should be reported by the operator not by the JV participant on whose behalf the payments 
are made.37 This approach again potentially paves the way for practices arguably against the 
spirit or reasonable interpretation of the law. Companies might (in principle) evade disclosure 
by adjusting payment structures employed by their JVs. By this interpretation, if a JVproject 
is operated by a company not subject to the EU Directive and the JV is structured so that 
ヮ;┞ﾏWﾐデゲ ;ヴW ﾏ;SW H┞ デｴW ﾗヮWヴ;デﾗヴ ﾗﾐ ヮ;ヴデｷIｷヮ;ﾐデゲげ HWｴ;ﾉaが ﾐﾗ ヮ;┞ﾏWﾐデゲ ┘ﾗ┌ﾉS HW ヴWヮﾗヴted 
for the project (unless reporting ensues under another applicable reporting regime).38 
Furthermore, the Industry Guidance advises on reporting payments to State-owned 
enterprises (SOEs) acting as field operators, stating that disclosure is only required when in-
scope payments (including satisfying size criteria) are distinguishable from other costs. This 
could again permit practices against the spirit or a reasonable interpretation of the law. 
The industry guidance (reflected in デｴW IOGPげゲ comment ﾉWデデWヴ デﾗ UKげゲ Cｴ;ヮデWヴ ヱヰ 
consultationぶ ヴWaWヴゲ デﾗ デｴW ﾐWWS デﾗ Wゲデ;Hﾉｷゲｴ ; Iﾗﾏﾏﾗﾐ ヴWヮﾗヴデｷﾐｪ ﾏWIｴ;ﾐｷゲﾏ ┘ｴｷIｴ けｷゲ ┌ゲWヴ-
friendly, not overly-prescriptive and not over-engineered or over-designedぐas this would 
IヴW;デW ┌ﾐﾐWIWゲゲ;ヴ┞ Iﾗゲデげく 
Petrofac includes a text in its submission letter to the Chapter 10 consultation similar to that 
of ExxonMobil and the guidelines:  
This transparency initiative is intended to be for the benefit of the public and whilst we fully 
support the intentions, we feelぐthe nature of the penalties suggested is excessive and 
disproportionate to the legal obligations of company directorsぐ[UK government]ぐshould 
recognise that the Chapter 10 payment reporting process is not intended to serve as a statutory, 
and therefore externally audited, financial procedure to be relied upon by investors and the City 
                                                          
37Where an oil concession is granted and operated by independent companies acting through a JV, one venture 
participant will take on the operator role, carrying responsibilities such as paying creditors, including 
governments, for the venture as a whole.  
38Industry stress that JV arrangements are extremely complex with compositions reflecting many commercial 
and legal risk factors (IR). It seems unlikely these agreements have been or would be modified to avoid 
disclosure. Yet, the industry view is nonetheless problematic in apparently condoning practices that, if arguably 
meeting minimum legal requirements, minimise disclosure, potentially entailing unreported payments. 
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in the same wayぐstatutory annual reports areぐthe payment reporting process has entirely 
different objectives.  
This problematic view contradicts that of PWYP who have argued that the transparency 
serves investors (as two members of IASB agreed, supra, Gallhofer & Haslam, 2007).  And, BIS 
noted in their consultation document that transparency is good for business (BIS, 2014a), 
something echoed by LG who asserted that けゲﾗﾏW ｷﾐ┗Wゲデﾗヴゲ ﾐﾗ┘ 
areぐ[demanding]ぐデヴ;ﾐゲヮ;ヴWﾐI┞げく  
Early reporting manifestations 
Early reporting by UK in-scope companies indicates practices deserving in-depth scrutiny.39 
Report form and content varied across our sample, from a statutory minimum spreadsheet 
uploaded to Companies House, to a separate pdf report, comprising statutory and some 
voluntary disclosures, available from reporting entitiesげ websites.  There were also evident 
variations in payment types disclosed (Table 1). Our analysis of 50 companies40 showed that 
けデ;┝Wゲ ﾉW┗ｷWSげ ;ﾐS けaWWゲげ ┘WヴW payments reported most frequently.  Dividends and bonuses 
paid to governments are scarcely disclosed, although they may be codified as different 
payment types (e.g. payments-in-kind).  
Insert Table 1 about here 
In-depth analysis of seven companies producing an additional long-form pdf report (BP, 
Glencore, Evraz, Rosneft, Royal Dutch Shell, Rio Tinto, BHP Billiton) indicated areas of 
apparent non-compliance. Glencore disclosed they made payments-in-kind but have not 
complied with requirements to elaborate on explanation, valuation and volumes. Yet 
Glencore provided non-ﾏ;ﾐS;デWS SｷゲIﾉﾗゲ┌ヴW ﾗa けI┌ゲデﾗﾏゲが ｷﾏヮﾗヴデ ;ﾐd expﾗヴデ S┌デｷWゲげ ;ﾐS 
reconciled their total payments to governments to the amount disclosed in their 2015 
Sustainability Report (Glencore, 2015, p5). BP, while complying with formal legal 
requirements, rely ﾗﾐ IOGP ｪ┌ｷS;ﾐIW ｷﾐ ゲデ;デｷﾐｪぎ けP;┞ﾏWﾐデゲ ﾏ;SW デﾗ ｪﾗ┗WヴﾐﾏWﾐデゲ ｷﾐ 
connection with joint ventures are included in the report and to the extent that BP makes the 
ヴWﾉW┗;ﾐデ ヮ;┞ﾏWﾐデく T┞ヮｷI;ﾉﾉ┞ぐ┘ｴWヴW BP ｷゲ デｴW ﾗヮWヴ;デﾗヴ ﾗa デｴW ﾃﾗｷﾐデ ┗Wﾐデ┌ヴWげく A a┌ヴデｴWヴ ケ┌ﾗデW 
from BPげゲ report (BP, 2015, p.3) ｷゲぎ けWｴWヴW ; ゲデ;デW-owned enterprise undertakes activities 
ﾗ┌デゲｷSW ﾗa ｷデゲ ｴﾗﾏW ﾃ┌ヴｷゲSｷIデｷﾗﾐが デｴWﾐ ｷデ ｷゲ ﾐﾗデ IﾗﾐゲｷSWヴWS デﾗ HW ; ｪﾗ┗WヴﾐﾏWﾐデげく F┌ヴデｴWヴが one 
cannot reconcile BPげゲ RPG to its annual financial statements, although BP refers to its RPG 
having a clean けﾉｷﾏｷデWS ｷﾐSWヮWﾐSWﾐデ ;ゲゲ┌ヴ;ﾐIW ヴWヮﾗヴデげ.  
Iﾐ デｴWｷヴ け┗ﾗﾉ┌ﾐデ;ヴ┞ SｷゲIﾉﾗゲ┌ヴWゲげ, BP and Glencore indicate that the Directive could be increased 
in scope and cover more things.  In their annual reports and accounts and sustainability 
                                                          
39 Of the 70 reporting companies, 50 were analysed (early compliers available to us at the time of our research). 
We benchmarked disclosures made by the 50 companies against a minimum disclosure checklist, constructed 
by analysing the law and applicable guidance. Type and frequency of payments were also noted across the 
sample.  
40 The sample reviewed comprised 47 companies listed on the London Stock Exchange and 3 unlisted companies 
filing reports with Companies House (the sample is detailed in [WITHHELD:BLIND REVIEW]). Two further 
companies submitted a file to Companies House but did not report any payments, disclosing a zero value: from 
their published accounts performing poorly with large tax losses and unlikely to have reportable payments, they 




reports they narrate a けbroader contributionげ to the socio-economic environments of the 
countries where they operate. In its RPG, BP emphasises its けHヴﾗ;SWヴ ゲﾗIｷﾗ-economic 
contribution to countries in which we operate in addition to the paymentsぐrequired to be 
ヴWヮﾗヴデWS ┌ﾐSWヴ デｴW ‘Wｪ┌ﾉ;デｷﾗﾐゲげく  And the following quote from BPげゲ Report is interesting 
hereぎ けP;┞ﾏWﾐデゲ ﾏ;SW デﾗ ｪﾗ┗WヴﾐﾏWﾐデゲ デｴ;デ ヴWﾉ;デW デﾗ デヴ;Sｷﾐｪが W┝ヮﾗヴデ ふヮｷヮWﾉｷﾐWゲぶが ヴWaｷﾐｷﾐｪ ;ﾐS 
processing activities are not included in this Report as they are not within the scope of 
extractive industries as defined by the Reg┌ﾉ;デｷﾗﾐゲげく Consultation with these companiesげ 
operations teams may illuminate what might be reported (or how regulations might be better 
specified). 
Our analysis of the reports of Rio Tinto and BHP Billiton41highlighted an area of potentially 
emerging good practice. They produced reconciliations of their tax payments in the report to 
their annual report and accounts. This arguably makes the reported information more useful, 
contextualising payments to governments within wider company performance and giving 
stakeholders the opportunity to assess the ｪヴﾗ┌ヮげゲ economic contribution to wider society. 
DISCUSSION AND ANALYSIS  
Our analysis indicates ;ﾏHｷ┗;ﾉWﾐIW ﾗa デｴW aﾗI;ﾉ ;IIﾗ┌ﾐデｷﾐｪ ﾉ;┘げゲ ﾏ;ﾐｷaWゲデ;デｷﾗﾐ ;ﾐS 
functioning in a complex contextual dynamic. The social analytical framing promoted in 
Gallhofer & Haslam (2017), with its emphasis on complex interactive dynamics of accounting 
elements in context as entailing progressive/regressive implications (in and through 
accounting), here particularly illuminates what has facilitated more positive dimensions. 
Focusing in and following Gallhofer & H;ゲﾉ;ﾏげゲ ふヲヰヱΑぶ ;S┗ｷIW デﾗ ;ヮヮヴWIｷ;デW the detail, we find 
a complex and rich ambivalence. Our analysis is informed by critical theorising of transparency 
and accountability. Theoretical appreciation is here advanced. We elaborate on this below. In 
our concluding comments we especially reflect on praxis implications of our analysis as well 
as summarise our paper. 
We found some evidence that aspects of the ヴWヮﾗヴデゲげ contents, this area being weakly 
regulated by the law, threatened to undermine their usefulness. Yet content was given more 
validity by a number of manifestations beyond legislative provisions, including limited 
assurance auditing, published reconciliations to audited statements and cross-reference to 
other information (whether manifest in parallel/overlapping developments or investigative 
journalism). Perhaps corporate practices of reporting/disclosing beyond the law in some 
cases are surprising, if less so when combined with appreciation of corporate strategy and 
SWaｷIｷWﾐIｷWゲ ｷﾐ Iﾗﾏヮﾉｷ;ﾐIW H┞ デｴW ゲ;ﾏW Iﾗﾏヮ;ﾐｷWゲ ﾗaaWヴｷﾐｪ け┗ﾗﾉ┌ﾐデ;ヴ┞げ SｷゲIﾉﾗゲ┌ヴWが ヮﾗｷﾐデｷﾐｪ デﾗ 
ambivalence. MﾗヴW ｪWﾐWヴ;ﾉﾉ┞ デｴWヴW ;ヴW ﾉｷﾏｷデゲ デﾗ デｴW ;IIﾗ┌ﾐデｷﾐｪ ﾉ;┘げゲ ゲ┌H┗Wヴゲｷﾗﾐ and related 
accounting inaccuracy (in terms of credibility as well as legality), albeit that the 
appropriateness of payments made (other than that they appear big or small) is off the radar 
of this legislation.  
                                                          





And reports are being used and in ways the legislation ostensibly anticipated. Indeed, reports 
were found useful (often alongside other information).  The interview with TC (and the 
authorsげ interactions with NGOs) indicated that reportsげ ┌ゲ;ｪW by NGOs was helping them in 
their campaigns, despite デｴW ヴWヮﾗヴデゲげ ﾉｷﾏｷデ;デｷﾗﾐゲが limitations which many appreciated (and are 
also challenging). Usages and users so far based on the UK-focused analysis are much as 
anticipated (but it seems likely that groups like ethical investors and journalists and others, 
such as governments and other companies in reputational battles, for instance, will increase 
their usage with the further establishment of the reporting). For now, civil society usage is a 
positive, tending to increase, rather than decrease, pressure on governments hosting 
extractives and receiving payments from them and upon extractives too.42 
Regarding the reportsげ form, the electronic form of reporting indicated inconsistencies in 
practice and access does not appear to be so user-friendly. At least in the UK, however, there 
has been no formal charge set for access. The aura of the reporting does not appear to be 
such as to put civil society activists off questioning or doubting the information, while the 
same activists make use of the information in conjunction with other sources, i.e. they do not 
over rely on it. The legal and expert nature of the reports, and other cultural attributes 
thereof, did not prevent NGOs from questioning and finding fault with the reports. Some 
reporting practices meant that the substance that civil society activists were interested in 
could not easily be discerned but this became a basis for criticising RPGs rather than failing to 
question them. Here, the civil society groups were aided by legal and expert allies.  These 
groups were not afraid to question the reports but were concerned to use them, appreciating 
how they can help now and in future. Prevailing cultural aspects, such as preference for 
ﾐ┌ﾏWヴｷI;ﾉ ;ﾐS aｷﾐ;ﾐIｷ;ﾉ けa;Iデゲげ ;ﾐS ヮヴWゲ┌ﾏWS ﾗHﾃWIデｷ┗ｷデ┞が rather lent support to civil society 
campaigns than undermined them. The very reporting prescriptions of the law are bound to 
displace alternative practices in some way. But the reports did not appear to displace 
alternative practices of information search by civil society activists. Effective joint usage of the 
reports with investigative journalism was deemed successful by TC. Joint usage with EITI 
reports is also deemed helpful (TC). 
FﾗI┌ゲｷﾐｪ ﾗﾐ デｴW ;IIﾗ┌ﾐデｷﾐｪ ﾉ;┘げゲ ﾏ;ﾐｷaWゲデ;デｷﾗﾐが ﾗur priors were that it would be very difficult 
to introduce a substantive workable law reflecting Iｷ┗ｷﾉ ゲﾗIｷWデ┞げゲ progressive aims. Industry 
concerns about the law reflect globalisation and economic interests of corporates, and some 
of these concerns are shared by governments (to the extent that they are dependent upon 
and influenced by corporations). We anticipated some regulatory capture by interests 
concerned about the law (the prevalence of which being emphasised by Baker, 2005; Archel 
et al., 2009). One may wonder why from this perspective the EU had been persuaded to 
introduce the law. And, similarly, one may wonder why the UK transposed the law early 
(earlier than much of industry wanted if the comment letters are taken as evidence): and 
introducing the law earlier than the EU required was a form of けｪﾗﾉS-ヮﾉ;デｷﾐｪげ ﾗa デｴW EU ﾉaw, 
going the extra mile. To some extent there were good intentions: and enormous efforts by 
civil society lobbyists. The good intentions are to some extent shared by key regulatory bodies 
                                                          
42 We acknowledge that other contextual forces are at work in determining whether these pressures are 
significant or not relative to other forces (see Mejía Acosta, 2009, 2013; Öge, 2014). 
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involved (and on some level industry). The international shifts (buttressed by the initial Dodd-
Frank s.1504), which also reflected substantive civil society effort, was helpful here. Take up 
of EITI and other developments helped fertilise possibilities for legal intervention. Perhaps 
regulators found some of ｷﾐS┌ゲデヴ┞げゲ claims exaggerated or saw a balance in the law industry 
could substantially work with. The UK government likely introduced the law early accelerating 
its own review so as to better input into the main EU review.  
Another factor acknowledged by the BEIS interviewee in discussion was that there were 
economic interests that favoured the regulation (in some form). For instance, the 
development of poor countries can contribute in some ways to global economic 
development, which may not only be in the interests of poorer countries. And all governments 
have an interest in maintaining/enhancing their revenues. Here appreciation of the wider 
contextual developments such as BEPS helps with the analysis: Nation States are worried 
about the relatively small revenues they are getting from corporations (compared with the 
potential). Industry also on some level benefits from stable and well-regulated States (which 
costs money) but it is not always easy for industry (and indeed government) to see the bigger 
picture (Dowling, 2014). Industry do appreciate not only a level playing field argument but 
also that some common standards may be better than none (including since the latter 
situation could engender costly reputational battles). So, the case helps to locate the 
accounting law and its trajectory vis-à-vis contradictions and tensions of 
globalism/globalisation in the context of the global democratic deficit, whereby people are 
subject to global forces that they are unable to control through democratic forces in the 
absence of global democracy (see Dryzek, 2011). 
One can reflect on whether the laws introduced were modified by attempts at regulatory 
capture, albeit that what we have presented above indicates at least something less than 
complete regulatory capture. Did industry lobbying shape the law negatively in this regard? 
Are aspects of the law more in the nature of token gestures? It seems reasonable to conclude 
that industry sought to influence the law (reflecting an interest different from openness and 
transparency, however much it was important economic interest and/or realpolitik) and that 
government was concerned to listen to ｷﾐS┌ゲデヴ┞げゲ views. The accountancy firms echoed 
industry in their comments. PwC used the argument that the law threatened to reduce 
compliance to a けtick-Hﾗ┝げ exercise (a point they may find easier to make here than vis-à-vis 
conventional and prescribed audit provisions). Further, NGOs were scarcely involved in a 
substantive and dialogic way in consultation ;ﾐS aWﾉデ デｴ;デ デｴW BI“げ ;デデWﾏヮデ デﾗ ｷﾐ┗ﾗﾉ┗W them in 
discussions over the law was tempered by industry having a direct line to government outside 
of the BIS framework for negotiation (as per LG and TC). Civil society, it should be noted, did 
have to compromise on their demands (e.g., notably accepting the weak regulation with no 
audit requirement or no requirement that RPGs be reconciled to the audited statements: 
serious weaknesses that nevertheless have not totally negated emancipatory actualities, and 
clearly not potentialities, in practice43). And the industry guidelines were problematic in areas 
like JV and project-by-project reporting. Such dimensions can clearly be interpreted in terms 
                                                          
43 Industry also can be seen as having compromised given its prior stance. Compliance costs and tensions with 
host countries had been cited in opposing the law. In the UK transposition, industry wanted to limit penalties 
and delay implementation but had to compromise on these things (supra). 
29 
 
of partial regulatory capture and are negatives highlighting ambivalence in the ostensibly 
progressive law (see Mercer, 2002).  
The accounting law could be written more clearly, with greater attention to project-by-project 
reporting and appropriate coverage of JVs and related areas, and clearly the provisions could 
be better regulated. At the same time, QC (advising the NGOs) held the law substantively 
reflected (most clearly in spirit) aims of enhancing transparency and accountability on behalf 
ﾗa ; ゲｷｪﾐｷaｷI;ﾐデ ﾐ┌ﾏHWヴ ﾗa デｴW ┘ﾗヴﾉSげゲ poor.  
The industry guidelines, which BIS pulled back from fully endorsing (they simply state they 
けヴW┗ｷW┘WSげ デｴWm), as QC suggested, do pave the way for practices against the ﾉ;┘げゲ ゲヮｷヴｷデ or 
against a reasonable interpretation of the law. This is found, e.g., ｷﾐ デｴW ｪ┌ｷSWﾉｷﾐWげゲ 
ｷﾐデWヴヮヴWデ;デｷﾗﾐ ﾗa けゲ┌Hゲデ;ﾐデｷ;ﾉﾉ┞ ｷﾐデWヴIﾗﾐﾐWIデWSげ ;ﾐS JV arrangements and reference to 
distinguishability of payments to SOEs acting as field operators. The comment letters indicate 
that companies (along with accountancy firms) were concerned to modify the law towards 
perceived corporate interests. Concurrently, cost arguments may be exaggerated but should 
be acknowledged: underlying them are concerns about economic consequences stemming 
from international competitive pressures that may promote particular relationships with host 
governments. Such concerns appear to have impacted the initial EU law, indicating some 
industry influence here (e.g., the lack of requirement for audit and/or reconciliation to the 
statutory accounts, the clear distinction of the RPG from the statutory annual report, the size 
criteria and perhaps those areas of the law effectively permitting differing interpretations). 
Such concerns are reflected in the industry guidance by the plea that law not be overly 
prescriptive, engineered or designed (supra). Civil society would prefer regulation applying 
globally and industry see appeal in this too (if they may differ on the terms) compared with 
more fragmentary regulation (where companies in different jurisdictions are subject to 
regulations differing in strength). This reflects ｪﾉﾗH;ﾉｷ┣;デｷﾗﾐげゲ governance deficits and 
difficulties of regulating the global context for the common and global good, if it is 
problematic to yield to such private interest concerns: a struggle on all fronts for better global 
governance infrastructure is needed (Held & McGrew, 2000).  
We find some early company reporting practices in the UK worthy of further investigation vis-
à-vis compliance with the ﾉ;┘げゲ ゲヮｷヴｷデ (if it is difficult finding supportive evidence given lack of 
clarity in the reports). It is hard to tell whether companies between themselves interpreted 
デｴW ﾉ;┘げゲ payment types consistently. Our in-depth analysis of seven company cases indicated 
areas of apparent non-compliance or interpretations which could be deemed contrary to the 
ﾉ;┘げゲ ゲヮｷヴｷデ. At least one major player appears to have followed the ｷﾐS┌ゲデヴ┞ ｪ┌ｷSWﾉｷﾐWゲげ JV 
interpretation and interpreted SOE activity outside the home jurisdiction as outside the ﾉ;┘げゲ 
scope. Some companies did appear to follow デｴW ﾉ;┘げゲ ヮヴｷﾐIｷヮﾉWゲ ケ┌ｷデW IﾉﾗゲWﾉ┞く 
An issue is what happens when there is non-compliance. Regarding the UK law, it is 
noteworthy that the Secretary of State or the Director of Public Prosecutions must agree to 
any prosecution brought. The Company Registrar can in principle act but needs the support 
of one of these persons. Here, we might remember that many industry comments stressed 
that proposed penalties were harsh, appealing for leniency in the early days oa デｴW ﾉ;┘げゲ 
operation (and most industry commentaries sought that the law be introduced in 2016, not 
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ヲヰヱヵぶく Iデ ｷゲ ;ﾐ ﾗaaWﾐIW デﾗ けﾆﾐﾗ┘ｷﾐｪﾉ┞ ﾗヴ ヴWIﾆﾉWゲゲﾉ┞げ ﾏ;ﾆW ; a;ﾉゲW ヴWヮﾗヴデく TｴW SWaWﾐIW ﾗa ;ヴｪ┌ｷﾐｪ 
that IOGP guidelines are being followed is not the soundest but may help vis-à-vis けﾆﾐﾗ┘ｷﾐｪﾉ┞ 
;ﾐS ヴWIﾆﾉWゲゲﾉ┞げ (QC). Rather than trying to prosecute (or along with this), civil society could 
seek to engage in dialogue more especially with government (at the EU level, especially the 
EC) to indicate concerns about what is or might be happening. This could enhance comments 
made by civil society and supporters vis-à-vis reviews of the legislation. But here we may see 
indications of why practice is and likely will be disappointing in this area. Civil society are 
forewarned but still, as noted, along with seeking improvement are using transparency 
achieved to further their aims (TC). 
We found some companies using the reports to legitimate activity, with some even noting the 
lawげゲ SWaｷIｷWﾐI┞ and disclosing HW┞ﾗﾐS デｴW ﾉ;┘げゲ ヴWケ┌ｷヴWﾏWﾐデゲ (e.g. Glencore and BP). Some 
companies apparently attempted to substantively reflect the reporting principles, a positive. 
No obviously serious economic consequences for industry have so far manifested from the 
current lawげゲ ﾗヮWヴ;デｷﾗﾐ. Companies have not felt too restricted: the seven companies we 
analysed went beyond prescriptions, making voluntary disclosures. Indeed, these companies 
indicated that the Directive could be broader in scope. BP ヮヴﾗ┗ｷSWS ; けﾉｷﾏｷデWS ｷﾐSWヮWﾐSWﾐデ 
;ゲゲ┌ヴ;ﾐIW ヴWヮﾗヴデげく 
There is a lack of trust, of course, involved in the accounting process here. Civil society groups 
would argue that based on experience information has not been forthcoming without 
prescription. It is a question of balance, perhaps. Something is lost in lack of trust but 
something is gained in the reporting: moreover, the issue is not so much not trusting the 
companies or probing their intentions but more about challenging problematic structures and 
opening them up to change. A similar point about balance applies to the difficulty of 
furnishing proper accountability and transparency, albeit the spirit of the accounting law is 
suggestive of quite straightforward disclosure in this case (and argumentation of Messner, 
2009, and Roberts, 2009, arguably has less purchase on the specific case in question). The law 
does not appear to colonize conduct through over-prescription.  
We thus found, consistent with the appreciation of emancipatory accounting, ambivalences 
in the trajectory of the accounting focused upon, on-going if dynamic mixtures of progressive 
and regressive forces reflective of a contextual complexity and its dynamic. Various sites of 
regulatory influence (themselves reflecting contradictions and tensions), including 
governments and even transnational corporations (along with civil society with its key 
campaigns), can foster emancipatory as well as regressive interventions and processes. The 
case illustrates that the critical theorising of accountability and transparency we highlighted 
can usefully be emphasised in theoretical argumentation. Accounting here becomes 
Wﾏ;ﾐIｷヮ;デﾗヴ┞ ｷﾐ ┗;ヴｷﾗ┌ゲ ┘;┞ゲが ｷﾐIﾉ┌Sｷﾐｪ デｴヴﾗ┌ｪｴ ;Iデﾗヴゲげ ヮヴ;ｪﾏ;デｷc engagement with 
accounting elements in context.  
While the above summarises some of the key moments and trajectories we found a rich detail 
illustrating ambivalence and complexity, whereby some manifestations were relatively 
progressive and some otherwise but both were mutable in the contextual dynamic, these 
including: explicit common good rationales; compromised law; issues of legislative phrasing; 
ｷゲゲ┌Wゲ ﾗa デｴW ﾉ;┘げゲ ﾗヮWヴ;デｷﾗﾐ ;ﾐS ｷﾏヮﾉWﾏWﾐデ;デｷﾗﾐき negotiated and complex capturing; 
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languages of negotiation over regulation and accountabilities/visibilities; issues of co-
ordinating/regulating (weakly in terms of levelling down/strongly in terms of levelling up; the 
ヴﾗﾉW ﾗa けﾃﾗｷﾐWS ┌ヮげ ;ヮヮヴﾗ;IｴWゲ) in the global context with its regulatory deficits and 
contradictions and tensions; corporate image management; review processes and their 
timing. All these aspects illustrate progressive/regressive dimensions of the accounting 
manifestation/functioning, a rich complexity. 
CONCLUDING COMMENTS 
Reflecting critical appreciation of manifestations of accounting and related practices, we 
sought here to understand better and assess the early operation of an accounting law 
transposed into the UK from the EU implicating CBCR. We explored and assessed processes 
of the ﾉ;┘げゲ construction and its early operation by focusing on its implementation in the UK 
(first adopter). We sought insights to indicate ways forward. 
In our analysis, we elaborated how some industry interpretations of the law ran counter to 
the lawげゲ spirit. And we began to indicate how such interpretations engendered different and 
apparently problematic translations of the law into practice. We articulated, however, 
ヮヴﾗｪヴWゲゲｷ┗W SｷﾏWﾐゲｷﾗﾐゲ ﾗa デｴW ;IIﾗ┌ﾐデｷﾐｪ ﾉ;┘げゲ ﾗヮWヴ;デｷﾗﾐ ;long with more regressive ones. 
The analysis tends to confirm that aspect of the Gallhofer & Haslam (2017) thesis: 
manifestations of accounting, even ostensibly progressive types, have problematic 
dimensions in their actual manifestations and functioning. Concurrently, the analysis also 
suggests that the law is already having a progressive impact and promising more in the future. 
Through recognising (via Gallhofer & H;ゲﾉ;ﾏげゲが ヲヰヱΑが ﾐW┘ ヮヴ;ｪﾏ;デｷゲﾏぶ デｴﾗゲW ;ゲヮWIデゲ 
facilitative of progressive ends the law can become even more emancipatory. 
That the law is being reviewed provides an opportunity to improve it and reflecting on our 
analysis we can suggest ways in which the accounting law might be more emancipatory in a 
けﾐW┘ ヮヴ;ｪﾏ;デｷゲデげ ゲWﾐゲWく We highlighted regulatory weakness and can make 
recommendations as to ways forward for the law consistent with sensitive interpretations of 
our analysis. The expression けsubstantially interconnectedげ might be helpfully clarified to 
encourage principled, consistent and substantive reporting practice. The UK law should 
ヴWaﾉWIデ デｴW Iﾉ;ヴｷaｷWS ﾏW;ﾐｷﾐｪ ;ﾐS ﾐﾗデ デ;ﾆW ゲﾗﾏWデｴｷﾐｪ aヴﾗﾏ デｴW DｷヴWIデｷ┗Wげゲ ヮヴW-amble into the 
main law. The ﾉ;┘げゲ Iﾉ;ヴｷaｷWS meaning should ensure that practices companies might be 
tempted to follow currently (supra) should be explicitly outlawed. Companies subject to UK 
law should disclose in-scope payments made on their behalf (by operators or other agents).  
When in-scope payments are made by operators on behalf of participants in JVs, participating 
companies should disclose at least their share of the payments.  Companies should have 
regard to underlying liabilities for payments under local law. Proper legal provision should be 
made for independent professional audit of RPGs (a pragmatic possibility is for the audit to 
HW ﾗa デｴW けﾉｷﾏｷデWS ;ゲゲ┌ヴ;ﾐIWげ ﾆｷﾐS included in international auditing standards). Provisions 
requiring reconciliation of figures to statutory accounts might be introduced. The size of 
payments criteria might be dropped as it currently may facilitate evasion of the lawげゲ ゲヮｷヴｷデ 
(or other ways of countering this evasion should be prescribed). Regarding payments, the 
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suggestion that they be distinguishable from other costs in the context of payments to SOEs 
operating as field operators appears unreasonable: a revision of the Directive can clarify the 
position explicitly. To avoid Sﾗ┌Hデ ｷデ ゲｴﾗ┌ﾉS HW Iﾉ;ヴｷaｷWS デｴ;デ デｴWヴW ｷゲ ﾐﾗ けヮヴｷﾏ;ヴ┞ ﾉｷゲデｷﾐｪげ 
exemption per se. There should be a clear procedure for challenging non-compliance that 
does not depend on the permission of the relevant Secretary of State or Director of Public 
Prosecutions and ideally a system of automatic penalties for non-compliance as reported by 
audit. One might expand disclosures required and perform social audits of the impacts of the 
companies on their hosts. A comprehensive joined-up approach is sensible and in some 
respects may be welcomed by industry, compared to current regulatory forces that tend to 
embroil companies in excesses of reports the contents of which overlap and are subject to 
different regulations. The challenge is to prevent levelling down of regulation in the process: 
such levelling down in effect would stimulate further proliferation of overlapping regulatory 
pressures. 
In addition to implications of the above points, our analysis suggests more general insights 
for praxis. For instance, the need to deploy a contextual and holistic approach is indicated in 
our contextual analysis of differing developments. Using the different streams of information 
together appears to make good sense. Points of co-ordination did appear to surface in terms 
of mutual overlapping interests between key protagonists: even big energy companies are 
threatened by instabilities and thus there may be at least some excesses of neo-liberalist 
policy that might be something of a common enemy. Yet there is concurrently a permanent 
struggle with interests opposed to transparency and accountability agendas. It is clear that 
while pressing on all regulatory fronts and seeking to join these forces up, civil society should 
also not give up on investigative journalism (and they are not doing). There are also areas 
where potential for civil society has been untapped in this area including ethical investment 
and more general ethical stakeholderism (we found little evidence of RPGs being used so far 
in relation to this). Usage of RPGs by journalists is as yet limited and should be encouraged 
more. But these are early days. Transparency across all value chain steps is still limited and 
there is scope to do more here. Direct interaction with governments of resource-rich 
countries could be enhanced (if some relatively close interaction has occurred through local 
NGOs, sometimes assisted by educational input from international civil society, which could 
be enhanced). 
Our analysis is substantively consistent with our prior positions. We regard Chapter 10 (and 
related developments) as reflecting worthy aims. And we find after the analysis we are still 
seeking to enhance and improve the accounting law rather than to negate it. Finally, we note 
that the law cannot be taken for granted. It was passed with a condition that it be reviewed 
(at both member state level, where a review can feed into the EU level review, and at the EU 
level): an opportunity to better it (e.g. to overcome regulatory deficiencies) or a threat to 
reverse positive potentialities.44 
                                                          
44 See Vinnari & Dillard (2016), who offer insight into the iterative process here, drawing upon appreciation of 
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* A company reports zero in the report prepared, but does not mention it did not pay any as it does when it comes to other types of payments 
**A company disclosed that payments were made but were not above the threshold, and therefore were not reported.  
Regs: reference to relevant legislation paragraph. 
 
Panel A: Content of Reports - Number of companies disclosing, The Regulations, Section 5(1) 
Mandatory Requirement Disclosed Not  Partial  
Government to which payments made 40 10  
The country of the government to which payments are made 50   
Total amount paid to each government 40  10 
Total amount per type of payment made to each government 39  11 
Total amount of payment made for each project 36 6 8 
Total amount per type of payment made for each project 38 6 6 
Panel B: Types of payments に Number of companies disclosing, Section 2 
Mandatory Requirement Disclosed Not  Partial  
Production entitlements 16 34  
Taxes levied 46 4  
Royalties 31 18 1* 
Dividends 2 48  
Bonuses 5 45  
Fees 38 11 1** 
Infrastructure improvements 22 28  
Panel C: Substance over form -  The Regulations, Section 5(5) 
Of the 41 companies presenting a PDF file, one company (BP) refers to the term substance over form in the report that is available online. 
Of the 29 companies presenting a CSV spreadsheet, none of the companies refer to the term substance over form. 
Panel D: Payments in kind  -  The Regulations, Section 5(6) 
Of the 41 companies presenting PDF files: 6 companies report that they have made in-kind payments, while 3 more companies include information on in-
kind payments without clearly identifying that they have made such payments; One company claims that payments were in cash, then discloses the 
following under production entitlements: けTｴｷゲ ｷﾐIﾉ┌SWゲ ﾐﾗﾐ-I;ゲｴ ヴﾗ┞;ﾉデｷWゲ ;ﾐS ;ﾏﾗ┌ﾐデゲ ヮ;ｷS ｷﾐ H;ヴヴWﾉゲ ﾗa ﾗｷﾉ ﾗヴ ｪ;ゲ ﾗ┌デ ﾗa デｴW Iﾗﾏヮ;ﾐ┞げゲ ┘ﾗヴﾆｷng interest 
share of production in a licence. The figures disclosed are produced on an entitlement basis rather than a liftings basis and are valued at the actual price used 
to determine entitlement. Of the 6 companies, 4 state the value of payment in-kind, volume and an explanation of how the value is determined, 1 states the 
value of the payment only and 1 states how the value of in-kind payment is determined only.  
Of the 29 companies presenting CSV spreadsheets, despite the fact that only one refers to payments in kind, 6 of them state the value of payments in kind, 
their volume and provide an explanation of how this value was determined. 
55 
 
 
